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Preface
This thesis has been written over the past four years, during my time first as a
master’s student and then as a Ph.D. student in finance at Tilburg University. It
consists of three papers on financial intermediation. Though each chapter is intended
as an independent, stand-alone paper, there is one overarching theme: the effects of
competition on financial intermediation. The classic reasoning behind competition
is that it offers choice to consumers. This should drive down prices and improve
quality for consumers. However, this simplified reasoning fails to take into account
externalities between the competing parties.
The separate chapters of this thesis study the effects of these externalities in
three contexts: Chapter 1 is a heavily modified version of my research master’s
thesis at Tilburg University. It studies the competition between banks as they try
to hire talented workers, and how this competition leads to wage structures that
induce excessive risk taking. Chapter 2 is co-authored with the co-promotor of this
thesis, Dr Fabio Castiglionesi, and my other supervisor, Dr Fabio Feriozzi, who is
currently working at IE Business School in Madrid. This chapter covers how the
possibility for firms to privately contract with multiple investors leads to excessive
liquidity provision. Finally, Chapter 3 covers how, in an economy in which a firm
contracts investment and liquidity insurance with multiple investors, intermediaries
are necessary for investment to be possible.
Before going to the heart of the thesis, there will first be an introduction for a
general audience, both in Dutch and in English. Then, the abstracts for all three
chapters follow in the “Abstracts” section of the introduction. These are intended
for an audience of academics with a background in finance or economics. Academic
introductions to each chapter will be at the beginning of the respective chapters.
The bibliography is combined for all chapters. There are three appendices with
proofs and some additional technical details. Except for some direct quotations, the
entire body of the thesis is written in English.
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avhandlingen. Tack s̊a jättemycket!
But finally, I need to thank my family. It has been, and still is, a privilege to grow
up among such a loving family. My family stimulated my intellectual curiosity from
an early age and taught me how much fun learning and discovering can be. Yet, they
also kept me firmly grounded: I learned from them that good scholarly achievements
do not entitle you to any feeling of superiority, but rather are a challenge to use the
talents you have been given to the fullest. Words cannot describe the importance
of the support, both moral and material, that my family has provided me at every
step along the very erratic course that led me to this Ph.D.
Maria, Ineke, dank jullie wel vooral voor het geduld dat jullie hebben gehad met
jullie betweterige broertje en al zijn rare projecten. Pap, mam, dank jullie wel voor
alles. Zoals ik zei, het is niet in woorden uit te drukken hoe belangrijk jullie steun
voor mij is geweest. Ik kan zonder een spoor van twijfel zeggen dat zonder jullie dit
proefschrift er niet was geweest.




Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Introduction 9
Inleiding — Nederlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction — English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1 Trader Compensation and Bank Risk: a Screening Approach 19
1.1 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2 Model: Exogenous Reservation Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.1 First Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2.2 Without Limited Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2.3 With Limited Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2.4 Enlarging the Bad Trader’s Investment Opportunity Set . . . 30
1.3 Model: the Banking Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3.1 The Less Flexible Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.3.2 The Flexible Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3.3 Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Provision 41
2.1 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 Autarky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 Benchmark Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.1 Exclusive Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.2 Monopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Non-Exclusive Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.1 Impossibility of the Benchmark Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Competition, Common Agency, and the Need for Financial Inter-
mediation 59
3.1 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7
CONTENTS
3.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.1 First Best and Exclusive Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.2 Market Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.3 Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4 Solving the General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.1 Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.2 Market Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Financial Intermediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.1 The Benevolent Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.2 Investors as Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.6.1 Bankruptcy Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.6.2 Exclusive Competition with “Small” Investors . . . . . . . . . 80
3.6.3 Type of Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Bibliography 88
A Proofs for Chapter 2 89
B Chapter 2 with a Finite Number of Principals 99
C Proofs for Chapter 3 105
8 Essays on Competition in Banking
Introduction
Inleiding voor een algemeen publiek — Nederlands
In het komische stuk “De knecht van twee meesters” uit 1745 verhaalt de Venetiaanse
toneelschrijver Carlo Goldoni over de avonturen van de knecht Truffaldino. Deze
Truffaldino heeft al een meester voor wie hij werkt, maar krijgt op een gegeven
moment de mogelijkheid gepresenteerd om tegelijkertijd ook nog voor een andere
meester te werken. Hij heeft altijd honger en watertandt dan ook bij de gedachte om
een dubbel loon te ontvangen en nog meer eten te kunnen kopen om zijn geweldige
honger te stillen. Hij overweegt stilletjes:
“...zou het niet mooi zijn om ze allebei te bedienen, dubbel loon te ont-
vangen en twee keer zo veel te eten? Het zou mooi zijn, als ze er nooit
achter kwamen. En als ze erachter komen, wat heb ik dan te verliezen?
Niks. Als de ene me de laan uitstuurt, houd ik de andere over.”1
Hij grijpt de mogelijkheid met beide handen aan en gaat voor beide meesters
werken. Al snel komt hij erachter dat dit moeilijker is dan hij had gedacht: hij haalt
de taken die hij voor zijn verschillende meesters uit moet voeren door elkaar, komt
door zijn werk voor de een niet meer aan het werk voor de ander toe en probeert
angstvallig voor elk van zijn beide meesters verborgen te houden dat hij ook nog voor
de ander werkt. Tegelijkertijd probeert hij ook nog zijn eigen, niet ongeringe, eetlust
te verzadigen. Het is niet moeilijk voor te stellen in wat voor doldwaze avonturen
hij hierdoor verzeild raakt. Gelukkig loopt het allemaal goed af en vindt Truffaldino
zijn ware liefde. Eind goed, al goed.
Tegenwoordig spreken we niet meer van “meesters” en “knechten”, maar in de
economische theorie vinden we relaties zoals die tussen Truffaldino en zijn meester
nog steeds bijzonder interessant. We spreken van principaal-agentrelaties. In dit
geval zouden we Truffaldino de agent noemen, en zijn meester de pincipaal. Het
centrale kenmerk van dit type relaties is informatie-asymmetrie: de knecht kent
zijn vaardigheden beter dan de meester die kent en de meester kan niet alles wat
de knecht doet in de gaten houden. De tak van de economische wetenschap die
zich bezighoudt met dergelijke situaties heet contracttheorie. De contracttheorie be-
studeert hoe verschillende partijen ondanks informatie-asymmetrie toch met elkaar
zaken kunnen doen door contracten te schrijven.
1In het origineel: “...No la saria una bella cossa servirli tutti do, e guadagnar do salari, e
magnar el doppio? La saria bella, se no i se ne accorzesse. E se i se ne accorze, cossa pèrdio?
Gnente. Se uno me manda via, resto con quell’altro.”, vertaling is van mijn eigen hand.
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In het bijzonder in de financiële economie speelt informatie-asymmetrie een be-
langrijke rol. De contracttheorie is dan ook een belangrijk middel in het bestuderen
van financieel-economische vraagstukken. Verzekeraars weten bijvoorbeeld niet hoe
risicovol een verzekerde is voordat ze een polis afsluiten, en kunnen na het afsluiten
van de polis ook niet constant in de gaten houden of de verzekerde zich niet roeke-
loos gedraagt. Banken kennen niet van tevoren de succeskansen van een bedrijf waar
ze in investeren of de precieze kredietwaardigheid van iemand die geld komt lenen.
Aandeelhouders van bedrijven kunnen niet alle werkzaamheden van directeurs en
managers in de gaten houden. Zo zijn er tal van voorbeelden. Met contracttheo-
rie kunnen we verklaren waarom je een eigen risico op je verzekering hebt, waarom
er onderpand op leningen zit en waarom directeurs in aandelen en opties worden
uitbetaald, in plaats van alleen in geld.
In de financieel-economische wetenschappelijke literatuur zijn veel van deze pro-
blemen bestudeerd in de context van exclusieve verhoudingen tussen principaal en
agent, en dat terwijl een 18e-eeuwse Italiaanse toneelschrijver al kon bedenken wat
een problematische — en hilarische — situaties het op kan leveren als een agent met
meerdere principalen tegelijk kan handelen. Zelfs in modellen met meerdere banken,
verzekeraars of investeerders die met elkaar concurreren, werd vaak aangenomen dat
de klant, het bedrijf, de manager of de verzekerde uiteindelijk maar bij één aanbieder
een contract kan afnemen. Dit wordt exclusieve concurrentie genoemd.
Exclusieve concurrentie levert vaak de beste uitkomsten op voor de agent, die
als klant kan kiezen tussen meerdere contracten die worden aangeboden. De agent
kiest dan die aanbieding, die voor hem het beste is. Als die aanbieding niet de best
mogelijke is, en de aanbieder er winst op maakt, zal een andere aanbieder altijd met
een net beter contract komen. Deze logica gaat echter niet meer op als de agent,
net als Truffaldino, stiekem met meerdere aanbieders tegelijk in zee kan gaan. Dit
komt omdat het contract dat je met één principaal hebt, invloed heeft op je gedrag
ten opzichte van de anderen. Dergelijke economische situaties, met niet-exclusieve
concurrentie, zijn in de laatste decennia binnen de economische theorie steeds uitvoe-
riger bestudeerd. Het is ook zeker niet lastig voor te stellen dat het bestuderen van
deze situaties veel aan praktische relevantie heeft gewonnen. Met de opkomst van
nieuwe technologieën, met nieuwe mogelijkheden om internationaal zaken te doen en
met mazen in de regelgeving, die slechts met moeite de ontwikkelingen in de wereld
kan bijhouden, is het steeds makkelijker geworden om met meerdere partijen tegelijk
te handelen.
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 (hoofdstuk 1 bespreek ik verderop in deze inleiding) gaan
over de effecten van niet-exclusieve concurrentie in concrete financieel-economische
situaties. Hoofdstuk 2 houdt zich bezig met de liquiditeit van bedrijven. In de
gangbare modellen van liquiditeit komt een bedrijf met zijn investeerders overeen
hoeveel die investeerders in het opstarten van een langetermijnproject steken en
hoeveel er achter de hand gehouden moet worden voor latere onvoorziene kosten.
Dit geld kan door het bedrijf zelf achter de hand worden gehouden in de vorm van
een voorraad contanten, of door de investeerders worden voorzien in de vorm van een
kredietlijn. Bij het aanhouden van liquiditeit speelt echter een afweging een rol: bij
teveel liquiditeit lopen de mogelijke kosten op, hetgeen voor de investeerders beperkt
hoeveel zij in het project kunnen steken. Bij te weinig liquiditeit bestaat het risico
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dat het bedrijf zijn kosten niet kan betalen en voortijdig opgedoekt moet worden, en
zijn langetermijnopbrengsten niet kan realiseren. Zodoende is het optimaal om een
vaste, maar begrensde, hoeveelheid liquiditeit af te spreken. Dit zal in een model
met exclusieve concurrentie dan ook de uitkomst zijn.
Stel nu dat een bedrijf tot een zeker bedrag aan liquiditeit heeft, zeg duizend
euro. Als dat bedrijf er dan achter komt dat het duizend en een euro nodig heeft, en
het de mogelijkheid heeft om ongemerkt een andere investeerder te benaderen, dan
zal het bedrijf graag de duizend euro van zijn oorspronkelijke liquiditeit gebruiken,
en nog een euro van een andere investeerder aantrekken. Natuurlijk geldt dit nog
steeds als het bedrijf tweeduizend euro nodig heeft, of drieduizend. Het is dus in de
praktijk moeilijk om de hoeveelheid liquiditeit te beperken. Het tweede hoofdstuk
van dit proefschrift leidt dit af in een formeel model en brengt dit in verband met
het feit dat in veel verschillende landen recent de cashvoorraden van bedrijven om
mysterieuze redenen aanzienlijk gegroeid zijn.
Het derde hoofdstuk gaat verder met het model van het tweede. Net zoals in
hoofdstuk 2 hebben bedrijven een grote hoeveelheid liquiditeit nodig van investeer-
ders. Als investeerders zelf maar een beperkte hoeveelheid geld hebben, zijn meer-
dere investeerders tezamen nodig om de potentiele kosten van het bedrijf te finan-
cieren. Indien meerdere investeerders samen echter het zelfde bedrijf financieren,
heeft elk van de investeerders er baat bij om het andere bedrijf zoveel mogelijk voor
de kosten op te laten draaien. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een model waarin dat altijd
mogelijk is, waardoor de economie ook niet functioneert als meerdere investeerders
elk een op een met een bedrijf handelen.
De enige manier waarop er in deze situatie toch gëınvesteerd kan worden, is
als de verscheidene investeerders hun geld aan een soort tussenpersoon geven, die
vervolgens het geld weer gebruikt om in het bedrijf te investeren en om het bedrijf
wanneer nodig van liquiditeit te voorzien. Op deze manier probeert hoofdstuk 3
het bestaan van financiële tussenpersonen, zoals banken, te verklaren. Dit wordt in
verband gebracht met bevindingen uit de economische geschiedenis, over in welke
periodes van de geschiedenis en in welke gebieden banken een belangrijke rol spelen
in economische ontwikkeling. Vooral Duitsland aan het einde van de negentiende
eeuw is in deze context veel bestudeerd.
Natuurlijk is er ook een eerste hoofdstuk. Dit gaat over een enigszins ander
onderwerp, maar heeft nog steeds te maken met de effecten van concurrentie in de
financiële sector. Het gaat over een onderwerp dat in de media uitvoerig besproken
is: het verband tussen de beloningsstructuur van bankiers en risico. Vaak wordt
een beeld geschetst van een “graaicultuur” van hebzuchtige bankiers die met hun
onverantwoorde en roekeloze gedrag de economie aan de rand van de afgrond hebben
gebracht, slechts om hun eigen bonus veilig te stellen.
Zonder een uitspraak te willen doen over hoe terecht de publieke verontwaardi-
ging is, probeert het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift in een theoretisch model
het verband tussen bonussen en risico’s in het bankwezen te bestuderen. In het
publieke debat wordt de kritiek vaak gericht op bankiers of banken zelf, of wordt
er gesproken over “cultuur”. Dit proefschrift, daarentegen, analyseert hoe bonussen
het gevolg zijn van concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt voor bankiers, en probeert te
zien hoe de kenmerken van deze arbeidsmarkt direct kunnen leiden tot overmatig
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risico.
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt deze arbeidsmarkt geanalyseerd met een vereen-
voudigd model. Potentiële bankiers verschillen in hoe goed zij zijn in het doen van
risicovolle investeringen. “Goede” bankiers kunnen voor de bank door het nemen
van enig risico daadwerkelijk betere winsten behalen, terwijl “slechte” bankiers dit
niet kunnen. De goede bankiers zijn de bankiers die goed zijn in het selecteren van
de juiste projecten om te financieren, die de betere investeringen kunnen uitkiezen of
de beste deals kunnen vinden. De slechte bankiers kunnen nog steeds op gemiddeld
niveau presteren als ze geen risico nemen.
Als de bank een bankier in dienst wil nemen, dan weet ze niet of deze goed
of slecht is. Door de juiste beloningsstructuur kan ze echter de goede bankiers
selecteren. Door gemiddelde prestatie niet al te hoog te belonen, maar juist aan
uitzonderlijk goede prestaties een bonus toe te kennen, schrikt de bank de minder
goede bankiers af, maar trekt ze juist de betere aan, omdat die weten dat ze een
grote kans hebben de bonus te krijgen.
De enige vraag die rest aangaande de beloningsstructuur is wat er gebeurt bij
slechte prestaties. Een soort “straf” op slechte prestaties is de aangewezen manier
om bankiers te weerhouden van het nemen van té veel risico. In de praktijk is de
mate waarin een bank zijn werknemers kan bestraffen echter vaak beperkt: ontslag
is meestal het ergste wat de bank kan doen, en zelfs dat is lastig. Deze beperking
maakt het lastig om overmatig risico tegen te gaan.
Als goede bankiers een veel hogere gemiddelde beloning eisen dan minder goede
bankiers, dan moet dat gebeuren door een hogere bonus. Dit maakt het noodzakelijk
voor een bank om een beloningsstructuur aan te bieden die ertoe leidt dat bankiers
overmatig risico nemen. Het feit dat goede bankiers een hogere beloning eisen kan
een gevolg zijn van concurrentie op de arbeidsmarkt. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een ver-
eenvoudigd voorbeeld van een arbeidsmarkt waar dit gebeurt: in deze arbeidsmarkt
concurreert één grote bank met meerdere kleine banken en is er één goede bankier
tussen vele minder goede. De grote bank is bereid om veel meer te betalen dan de
kleine banken voor deze goede bankier, aangezien zijn vaardigheden meer verschil
uitmaken op de grotere investeringen van de grote bank. Dit komt overeen met hoe
de betere bankiers voor grote investeringsbanken als Goldman Sachs en J.P. Morgan
komen te werken.
Er is echter één probleem dat het lastig maakt voor de grote bank: de kleine
banken zouden de goede bankier ook graag willen hebben. Om er voor te zorgen dat
de goede bankier niet weggekaapt wordt, moet de grote bank dus een hoge bonus
bieden, maar moet ze nog steeds een laag basissalaris bieden om ervoor te zorgen
dat ze de minder goede bankiers weghoudt. Dit leidt tot een beloningsstructuur die
op haar beurt weer bankiers aanzet tot het nemen van overmatig risico.
Hoe hoog dat risico is, hangt af van de structuur van de arbeidsmarkt: bij een zeer
flexibele arbeidsmarkt kunnen kleine banken gemakkelijk goede bankiers wegkapen.
Dit drijft de prijs van deze bankiers op, waardoor de banken extra hoge bonussen
moeten geven, hetgeen weer leidt tot een hoog risico. Als de arbeidsmarkt minder
flexibel is, is dit effect minder sterk en ligt het risico minder hoog. In beide gevallen
kan het risico echter nog steeds overmatig zijn, als gevolg van de concurrentie op de
arbeidsmarkt.
12 Essays on Competition in Banking
En dat brengt ons weer terug bij het overkoepelende thema van dit proefschrift:
concurrentie in de financiële sector. Ik wil niet beargumenteren dat concurrentie
in wezen slecht is. In het dagelijks leven komen we vaak genoeg voorbeelden tegen
van hoe concurrentie leidt tot lagere prijzen en betere producten. De verscheidene
hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift geven echter een aantal voorbeelden van negatieve
effecten van vrije concurrentie in het bankwezen: het kan leiden tot overmatige liqui-
diteit, te weinig investering, overmatig risico of — soms ongewenste — concentratie
in de financiële sector.
Introduction for a General Audience — English
In his comedy from 1745, “The Servant of Two Masters”, the Venetian playwright
Carlo Goldoni describes the adventures of the servant Truffaldino. Truffaldino, who
already works for one master, is presented with the option of working for a second
master at the same time. As he is always hungry, his mouth waters as he contem-
plates the possibility of receiving a double paycheck with which to buy food to still
his tremendous appetite. He says to himself,
“...wouldn’t it be a beautiful thing to serve both of them, to gain two
salaries, and to eat twice as much? It would be great, if they never
realized. And if one of them realizes it, what do I lose? Nothing. If one
of them sends me off, I’ll be left with the other one.”2
He proceeds to work for both masters, and quickly finds that this is harder than
he thought: he starts confusing the tasks he has to do for his different masters,
runs out of time to serve both, and tries anxiously to hide from each of his masters
the fact that he is working for the other. Of course he still has to satisfy his own
immense appetite, so one can of course imagine the series of comical misadventures
this leads to. Luckily for Truffaldino, he finds love in the end, and all’s well that
ends well.
In economics, the kind of relationship between Truffaldino and his master is
called a principal-agent relationship. In this situation, we would refer to Truffaldino
as the agent, and to his master(s) as the principal, since we do not really talk
about servants and masters anymore these days. These sorts of relationships are
characterized by information asymmetry : a “servant” typically knows more about
his own ability than his master does, and the master cannot monitor every single
action the servant takes. The branch of economics that studies outcomes in these
sorts of relationships is called contract theory. It studies how economic parties try to
bridge these information asymmetries by writing contracts on observable outcomes.
Contract theory is a useful tool to describe situations in financial economics,
where asymmetric information plays an important role: insurance companies can-
not monitor the behaviour of their policy holders or know how risky they are, banks
cannot fully observe the behaviour and the creditworthiness of firms or private bor-
rowers that they finance, and shareholders cannot control what their executives are
2The original reads “...No la saria una bella cossa servirli tutti do, e guadagnar do salari, e
magnar el doppio? La saria bella, se no i se ne accorzesse. E se i se ne accorze, cossa pèrdio?
Gnente. Se uno me manda via, resto con quell’altro.”, translation is my own.
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doing. Thus, contract theory rationalizes why we have deductibles on our insurance
or collateral on our mortgages, and why executives are paid in stocks and options,
rather than just in cash.
However, even though an 18th-century Italian playwright already realized the
problems that could arise from having multiple principals, many situations in fi-
nancial economics have only been studied with the assumption that an agent would
only have an exclusive relationship with a principal. In many cases there would be
multiple principals (e.g., multiple banks, multiple insurance companies) competing
in offering contracts to the agent, but the agent is restricted to choose only one
of them. This we refer to as exclusive competition. Competition, it was reasoned,
would always make sure that the agent best possible contract given the information
asymmetries. The principal, on the other hand, would make no profit. If any prin-
cipal would offer a contract that is not the best one for the agent, another principal
would come in and offer a slightly better contract.
However, these papers tacitly assume that the agent can only choose the con-
tract from one principal. If, like a modern-day Truffaldino, a firm can borrow from
several banks, an executive can get paid by multiple firms, or a person can get in-
surance from multiple companies, the classic reasoning might not work anymore.
This is because the contract an agent has with one principal has an influence on his
behaviour towards the others. In the last decades, these situations of non-exclusive
competition and common agency have become an active field of study in (financial)
economics. One can even imagine that if economies are becoming freer and more
international, and if technology or legal loopholes are making it easier for firms and
private persons to secretly contract with different financiers, then studying these
situations is becoming more and more relevant.
Chapters 2 and 3 (Chapter 1 will be discussed later on in this introduction) of this
thesis are concerned with the effects of non-exclusive competition on very concrete
situations in finance. Chapter 2 considers the effect on the liquidity of firms. In
the conventional models of liquidity, investors and firms agree on how much they
invest at the start-up of an investment project, and how much they keep in order
to face potential, uncertain, costs at a later date. This liquidity is then supplied by
allowing the firm to hold a cash buffer, or by investors providing a firm with a credit
line up to a certain amount. There is a trade-off here: if investors supply too much
liquidity, the potential costs of the project are higher, which limits the amount the
investor can put into the project initially. If there is too little liquidity, the chance
that the firm can face costs becomes smaller, limiting the potential revenue from the
project. Thus, it is optimal to agree upon a certain limited amount of liquidity.
However, let’s say that the firm can secretly contract with multiple investors.
If it can only get liquidity up to, say, a thousand euros, and then faces a cost of a
thousand and one euros, it would really like to have this additional euro. For this one
euro, the firm can approach another investor, while still getting the thousand from
its credit lines or cash buffer. This is still the case if the firm can get liquidity up
to two thousand or three thousand euros, and so on. This means that, in principle,
there is no limit to the liquidity that the firm can obtain from investors. The second
chapter of this thesis studies this, and uses it to explain the puzzling fact of recent
build-ups in cash holdings by firms.
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The third chapter expands upon the second. In the second chapter I find that
investors need to provide large, potentially unlimited amounts of liquidity to firms.
The problem is that, if the investors themselves only have a limited amount of funds,
these might not be sufficient to supply a firm with all the liquidity it needs. This
would mean that multiple investors together need to team up to finance a firm.
However, in that case, a new problem arises: each investor in a team of investors
would rather see the others in the team provide liquidity to the firm before they
do. Chapter 3 looks at situations in which investors would always have a possibility
to make sure of that, through adjusting the price they charge the firm for liquidity.
This leads to a market breakdown.
That means that one investor is not enough, but two are too many. The only
way out of this conundrum is for the different investors to pass their money on to
one single intermediary, who then invests in the firm. Thus, Chapter 3 explains why
banks, and other intermediaries, are needed within a financial system. Furthermore,
Chapter 3 ties this to some of the previous work done by economic historians, which
asks why intermediated finance played such a major role in certain places and in
certain episodes of history. Especially Germany in the late nineteenth century forms
an interesting case study.
Of course, there is also a first chapter. This chapter is on a slightly different topic
than the other two, though it also studies some of the negative effects of competition
on the banking system. It discusses a topic that has been very actively discussed
in the public sphere: bonuses and risk. The image of bankers taking massive risks,
bringing our economy to the brink of collapse just to get their precious bonuses,
has been painted all too often in the media. Much of the public outrage has been
directly aimed at the bankers or banks themselves. Slogans about the “fat cats” on
Wall Street having learned nothing, still carelessly taking excessive risks, abound.
Without taking a stand about how righteous this outrage is, the first chapter
tries to theoretically understand the connection between risks and bonuses. And, as
any paper in economics is supposed to, it tries to do so without hating the player,
but rather by taking a good look at the game. The first question that needs to be
answered is why banks offer their bankers a remuneration structure with bonuses, a
second question is what constitutes “excessive” risk taking, and the third is whether
and how the remuneration structure leads to excessive risk. The final, and probably
most important, question is whether, if there are remuneration structures leading to
excessive risk, we can do anything about it, for example by regulating the banking
sector.
The first chapter analyzes a simple model in which banks try to hire bankers.
Some bankers (the “good” bankers) are better than others, in the sense that if they
take risk, they have a better chance of performing well. These might be the bankers
that are really good at finding good deals, finding the right companies to finance,
or finding the “next Apple” stock to invest in. The less skilled bankers (the “bad”
ones) can still perform adequately and get an average performance.
If banks do not know the skill level of their prospective employees, they can still
make sure they hire the good employees by rewarding good performance. They can
make sure to hire only the good bankers, keeping out the bad ones, by not rewarding
a mediocre performance very well. This can be achieved through a pay structure
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with a relatively low base salary, but high bonuses.
The question that is left about the remuneration structure is what happens in
case of bad performance. In practice, there is a limit to how much a bank can
“punish” its employees in case of bad performance. Firing an employee is often the
worst they can do, and even that is often very complicated. However, the prospect
of some sort of punishment is the way to keep bankers from taking excessive risk.
Chapter 1 models how, if good bankers command a much higher salary than bad
ones, banks need to set a pay structure that induces excessive risk taking. This can
be a result of competition on the labour market. In the simple model of the labour
market, as presented in this thesis, there is one larger bank, with a large amount of
assets to invest, competing on a labour market against many smaller banks. There
is only one good banker out there. The large bank really wants to hire this banker,
as investment skills will make more of a difference with the large investments of
this bank than with those of the smaller banks. In the real world, this would mean
that the better bankers end up working for Goldman Sachs or J.P. Morgan, simply
because their skill makes more of a difference there.
Smaller banks, though, would still rather hire this one good banker than one of
the bad ones, and thereby drive up the price of the good banker: the bigger bank
needs to come up with a sufficiently lavish pay package to make sure the good banker
does not choose to go to a smaller bank. The big bank, however, still needs to set its
base salary low enough to make sure bad bankers do not accept employment. Thus,
in order to attract the good banker, and only the good banker, the bank needs to
set a pay package that includes a large bonus to reward good performance.
In the first chapter, it is shown that this bonus can be so high that it becomes at-
tractive for the banker to choose an overly risky investment. Just how risky depends
on the way the labour market is organized: if the labour market is very flexible, and
bankers could potentially switch banks easily, then it becomes very costly to retain
good workers, which drives up the potential bonuses and the resulting risk. If the
labour market is relatively rigid, and bankers cannot easily switch between jobs,
excessive risk can still arise as a consequence of labour market competition.
This brings us to the overarching theme of this thesis: competition in the financial
sector. Of course this thesis does not in any way want to argue that competition
is bad. In our daily life we often come across examples of how competition leads
to better products at lower prices. However, this thesis argues that, especially in
the financial sector, free competition can have some negative effects: it can lead to
excessive liquidity holdings, underinvestment, consolidation and excessive risk.
Abstracts
Below are the abstracts of the three different chapters.
Abstract of Chapter 1
This chapter argues that excessive risk taking by financial institutions is a result
of the need for these institutions to hire their traders from a labour market with
dispersed talent. On the one hand, institutions want to hire only talented workers,
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making sure untalented ones do not seek employment with them. In order to pick
only the best bankers, the institution can offer a low base salary and high bonuses.
Talented workers, knowing they have a large chance of obtaining the bonus, accept
employment while less talented ones do not. On the other hand, if workers are
protected by limited liability, these high-powered incentives can lead to excessive risk
taking. This chapter first offers a simple model with workers of different abilities who
have different outside options, and derives conditions under which excessive risk is
taken. Then a labour market model is studied with banks of different sizes, in which
the most talented worker ends up working for the biggest bank, where his talents are
most productive. However, the competition from smaller banks endogenously raises
the outside options for the good trader, giving rise to the need for high-powered
incentives and scope of excessive risk taking. Then the effects of labour market
mobility on the incentives to take risk are studied.
Abstract of Chapter 2
This chapter studies the effect of non-exclusive competition on liquidity provision in a
generic financial intermediation setting. Consider the baseline model by Holmström
and Tirole (1998) in which a firm in need of funds exclusively deals with a lender.
The lender is willing to provide an up-front investment and a finite liquidity facility
in exchange for part of the project’s proceeds. The firm obtains a share of its
project’s payoff because of a moral hazard problem at the firm level. If the firm
can privately contract with several lenders, there is a difficulty in limiting liquidity
provision. Outside lenders can free ride upon the liquidity provided by an incumbent
lender in exchange for the firm’s original share. As a first result, this has the effect
that the equilibrium from Holmström and Tirole (1998), with exclusive competition,
is no longer sustained. As a second result, we show how an incumbent lender can
ward off the outside lenders by offering unlimited liquidity support. The observed
shift from exclusive to non-exclusive contracting environments could therefore help
to explain the increase in liquidity holdings by firms.
Abstract of Chapter 3
This chapter argues that financial intermediaries serve to coordinate competition be-
tween investors. It starts out by modeling an economy without intermediaries: bor-
rowers have access to a project that requires initial investment and faces a stochastic
liquidity shock at an intermediate date, before realization of the project’s proceeds.
Investors can supply funds for starting the project and for insuring the project
against liquidity shocks. Competition between investors is assumed to be uncoor-
dinated and non-exclusive. The non-exclusive nature of the competition makes it
impossible to limit the intermediate date liquidity supply to the borrower, as in-
vestors can try to extend the liquidity supply to a borrower by free-riding upon
the liquidity supply of others. However, as the liquidity supply needs to be larger,
multiple investors together are needed to finance each borrower, giving rise to a
common agency problem: each investor wants to make sure the other investors are
responsible for supplying liquidity more than he is. These two problems lead to an
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unraveling of the market if borrowers only contract directly with investors. Trade
can be restored by intermediaries. The chapter discusses how either a social planner
can restore trade by becoming an intermediary or how investors can offer to become
intermediaries.
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Chapter 1
Trader Compensation and Bank
Risk: a Screening Approach
If you out for mega cheddar, you got to go high risk.
Ice T, Don’t Hate the Playa
Bonuses for executives at banks, hedge funds and asset management companies
have led to a great controversy as a result the financial crisis, becoming a major
theme in the public debate. Within the public dialogue, bonuses are commonly
connected to risk taking. The picture often painted in the public sphere is one
of bankers taking excessive, value-destroying risks, attracted as they are by the
prospects of high bonuses. From this picture a bewildering question arises: why
would a rational bank set a pay structure that induces their traders to take excessive
risks? The aim of this paper is to model the role that hidden information plays in
the contractual relation between the bank and its traders, and to study the interplay
between compensation and risk taking.
In attempting to tackle the issue of risk taking and compensation in the bank-
ing sector, one first needs to address the rationale behind a variable remuneration
structure. In this paper, variable pay is not primarily used to induce an agent to
provide some costly effort that potentially improves the probability distribution of
the project this agent manages. Even though bankers can enhance their revenues
through better client pitching, more research or closer monitoring, this paper takes
unobservable skill differences to be the main rationale for a variable remuneration
structure: banks try to screen possible traders by setting return-dependent wage
schemes that deter less skillful traders from taking on a job at the bank. Meanwhile,
more skillful ones accept these contracts, knowing full well that they have a better
probability of earning a higher return, and thus a higher wage.
The reason why skill differences have a particularly salient effect in the financial
sector is that the potential gains that a smart, talented worker can earn a bank or
fund is only bounded by the funds the financial institution has available for trade,
and not by production capacities of plants or demand for goods and services. Several
papers in the macroeconomics and labour economics literature (Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1991; Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman, 2011; Kneer, 2013) argue that,
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particularly in economies with highly deregulated banking sectors, banking offers a
return on talent to skilled workers that the real economy does not. This paper does
not aim to study this difference in returns to skill between the financial and real
sectors, but rather takes the high rewards to skill as a given feature of the banking
system. As the Squam Lake Working Group (Bernard, et al. 2010) put it,
“(...), even among those with similar professional qualifications, there
are tangible differences in the skills of financial employees, and even a
small difference in skill can have an enormous impact on the profits of a
financial firm.”
The other feature that sets the financial sector apart from other sectors of the
economy, and that plays an important role in this paper, is that in a financial firm, at
any level of the organizational hierarchy, workers have a large amount of discretion
over the risks they take, and to which they subsequently expose the financial firm
for which they work. This discretion is often necessary as traders need to be able to
react quickly to market movements, and corporate bankers must work to offer loans,
underwritings or other services before the competition does. This goes all the way
down to loan officers, who can decide on the loans they give to households and small
businesses. Ex post, often only the profits and losses of a trade or the performance
of a loan can be used in the compensation contract, whereas the discretionary risk
that a worker takes remains difficult (or, in this case, impossible) to verify.
In this paper, skill differences give rise to wage differentiation. Good traders have
an investment opportunity set that includes risky assets with a higher return than
the risk-free investment. There is an optimal investment and with respect to this,
there are both inefficiently prudent and inefficiently risky investments. Throughout
most of the paper it is assumed that bad traders only have access to the risk-free
investment. A bank needs to hire a trader to manage its trading budget. In order
to make sure only a good trader accepts employment, it offers a contract with a
rather low reward for a merely average return (which also the bad trader could get
by investing in the safe investment), but a high reward for a high return (which only
the good trader has a high enough chance of achieving). However, if the trader is
protected by limited liability, the bank cannot keep him from taking excessive risk.
This dynamic is first studied in a context in which good traders exogenously
have higher reservation utilities than bad ones. If traders are protected by limited
liability, and good traders command a very high wage premium with respect to bad
ones, payment for the good traders must be so convex, as a function of performance,
that good traders are induced to take excessive risk.
The paper then goes on to model a stylized labour market in which banks of
different sizes offer contracts to the traders. As good traders are more productive
at larger banks, larger banks will end up hiring good traders. However, in order to
make sure smaller banks do not make more attractive offers to good traders, larger
banks need to pay a skill premium for good traders, potentially leading to excessive
risk. The level of this skill premium is dependent upon the nature of the labour
market: if the labour market is flexible, smaller banks can steal good traders away
from larger banks, after learning the trader’s type from the fact that he works for
the large bank. Thus the premium large banks must pay to keep the good trader
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is very high in this case. In a less flexible labour market, banks only compete for
talent ex ante, so that the good trader’s rent is lower. It turns out risk in the more
flexible labour market is higher.
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows: after a review of the literature
in Section 1.1, Section 1.2 offers a simple model in which good and bad traders
exogenously have different reservation utilities. Section 1.3 introduces a stylized
labour market, with varying degrees of flexibility. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.1 Literature
On the theoretical side, the literature on the topic of remuneration in financial insti-
tutions has been surprisingly scant for a long time, but recently a number of papers
have appeared that study (executive) compensation at banks and its interplay with
risk taking. Thanassoulis (2012) derives how competition on the banking job mar-
ket creates a negative externality, increasing the default risks of banks. In another
paper by the same author (Thanassoulis, 2011), a model with both moral hazard
and adverse selection is presented in which lesser-ability traders have the possibility
to shift risks across time. Again because of the externality caused by competition,
he finds that it is sometimes the constrained optimal solution to allow lesser-ability
traders to shift risks.
In another recent paper, Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2010) address the con-
tracting problem between depositors, debtholders, bank shareholders and executives.
They use a pure moral hazard model in which contracts for executives can only be
based on market prices of the bank’s debt and equity. They find that without regula-
tory intervention bank executives tend to shift risks to the detriment of debtholders
and depositors. They also address how the CDS spread can be used as part of the
compensation contract in order to mitigate risk-shifting incentives.
In terms of modeling, this paper is very close to the baseline model in Diamond
(1998). In that model, agents’ projects have three possible levels of payoffs. Effort
gives the agent access to a range of distributions over these payoffs, and the contract
needs to both give the agent the incentive to provide effort and align the agent’s
interests with those of the principal so that the agent chooses the project most
profitable for the principal. They find that optimal payment is “almost” linear in
the sense that the optimal payment schedule converges to a linear one when the cost
of effort tends to zero.
There has been a body of empirical literature studying (executive) compensation
and risk taking, mostly focusing on CEOs. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010)
address the cross-sectional heterogeneity in both executive pay and risk and find
that, controlling for firm size and sub-industry, riskier banks tend to have higher
executive compensation. They argue that in order to convince executives to work
for inherently riskier firms, overall compensation should be higher. DeYoung, Peng,
and Yan (2013) use a panel of commercial banks and find that, when executives have
compensation packages with a large sensitivity to stock price volatility, their banks
tend to be riskier according to several measures. They also find that, controlling for
this effect, a higher sensitivity to the level of the stock price reduces risk taking.
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In another recent paper, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) perform a cross-sectional
study on CEO pay packages and share performance during the recent 2007-2009
financial crisis. They find that banks in which CEO compensation in 2006 was
more sensitive to share price performed worse during the financial crisis. This would
support the hypothesis that pay that is strongly related to performance induces more
risk taking. They do find, however, that sensitivity of pay packages with respect to
share price volatility did not have any influence on share performance during the
crisis.
Beside these very recent contributions, there is a large literature on executive
compensation and risk, both at banks and other firms. Agrawal and Mandelker
(1987) find that, for general firms, option-based executive compensation induces risk
taking. Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that pay is more performance-related in less
regulated sections of the banking industry. Houston and James (1995) report that
the payment structure in the banking industry is significantly different from that in
other industries. Their finding is that executive pay at banks is more conservative.
Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) find that banks with relatively more option-based
compensation tend to be riskier. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) report that, following
deregulation of the banking industry, variable pay increased at banks.
There exists a related literature on delegated portfolio management. In the clas-
sical delegated portfolio management set-up, the agent also has the post-contractual
discretion to choose his exposure to a risk factor. This literature starts out with
Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), who present a model in which an investor tries
to screen potential money managers that differ in their forecasting accuracy of a
normally distributed variable that influences portfolio returns. The model by Bhat-
tacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) is one in which information is the most important
good and the accuracy of that information is the determinant of quality. The authors
also explicitly assume normal distributions. Their model has very similar assump-
tions and results to those in the present paper. The main difference between their
paper and the present is that they do not explicitly address the issue of risk taking.
An explicit characterization of skill differences is common throughout the liter-
ature. A notable exception is the model by Foster and Young (2010), who use a
distinction between skilled and unskilled managers that is akin to the one presented
in the current work: in their model, a skilled and an unskilled manager can both
easily replicate a benchmark. In their paper, the bad agent can also mimic the
strategies of a skilled manager, but at a greater downside risk, making track records
an imperfect way of measuring skill.
A strongly related paper is the one by Palomino and Prat (2003). They model
the case of a money manager choosing assets on behalf of an investor. The manager
has the discretion to choose both a level of costly effort and a level of risk, as such
presenting the full moral hazard case of the setup in the present paper. They find
that the incentive and participation constraints, combined with limited liability,
rule out affine contracts. They also find that a binary bonus contract is among the
optimal contracts. Lastly, they do find that deviations from optimal risk taking are
possible, both in the direction of excessive risk and excessive prudence.
Other papers do not necessarily study the optimal contract, but rather take the
contract as given and study its implications. Allen and Gorton (1993) explain the
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phenomenon of “churning”, or trading without any specific reason or insight, by the
fact that traders with no particular knowledge enter the market in order to obtain
performance fees. Das and Sundaram (2002) study the pros and cons of incentive
contracts and symmetric contracts in a signalling model. Hodder and Jackwerth
(2007) numerically study the risk-taking incentives provided by typical hedge fund
compensation contracts, taking into account the possible differences between the
evaluation period of returns and the trading horizons of the fund manager. A com-
prehensive review of the delegated portfolio management literature can be found in
the paper by Stracca (2006).
There have been some papers in the market microstructure literature studying
the asset pricing implications of misalignment between the interests of a financial
manager and the owner of the assets. As previously mentioned, the paper by Allen
and Gorton (1993) that studies the effects of information asymmetry. Froot, Scharf-
stein, and Stein (1992) model how asset pricing anomalies can be caused by short-
term thinking. More recently, Dasgupta and Prat (2008) built a model in which
traders’ career concerns lead to conflicts of interest and study how these career
concerns affect market microstructure.
There is also some debate about to what extent traders’ skills or the effort they
put into information acquisition can influence their returns. Indeed, several studies
(Malkiel, 1995, 2003; Gruber, 1996) find that, on average, active mutual fund in-
vestors do not perform better than the passive market benchmark. The fact that
mutual fund managers, who can devote all their time and effort to investment-related
activities, do not outperform the market can be explained by either the hypothe-
sis that effort does not make much of a difference or that the pay structure in the
highly regulated mutual fund industry does not induce effort. In order to examine
the effect of skill, it is much more relevant to study persistent cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in fund performance. Berk and Green (2004) find only mixed evidence for
persistence in relative performance, but also model how the absence of persistence
does not necessarily imply the nonexistence of differential ability across managers.
In a large study conducted among Finnish retail investors, Grinblatt, Keloharju,
and Linnainmaa (2012) find that investors with a higher IQ exhibit more rational,
“sensible” trading behaviour and gain higher returns.
In the theoretical literature as well as in the public debate, there has been mention
of deferred pay. The public debate focuses on how deferred pay prevents traders from
buying bubble assets, as is also put forward by the Squam Lake Working Group
(Bernard, et al. 2010). The main theoretical contribution in the field focuses on
another rationale behind deferring bonuses: Jarque and Prescott (2010) model the
situation in which a banker’s actions have an influence on both first- and second-
period cash flows. If the second-period cash flow is informative about the banker’s
effort, the bank has to use this information in the trader’s remuneration, which can
only be done by deferring pay. The model by Thanassoulis (2011) also addresses the
use of deferred pay, and its shortcomings, in mitigating the risk-shifting incentives
of lesser-ability agents. Whatever the rationale, the idea of deferred pay has caught
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on, both in the industry itself1 and among policy makers2.
This paper differs from most of the literature relating moral hazard and (exec-
utive) compensation in that the main hidden action the agent can engage in post-
contractually is choosing the risk he exposes the principal to. Furthermore, the
adverse selection aspect of the problem necessitates a more complicated structure,
in which the typical “bonus contracts” studied in the delegated portfolio manage-
ment literature (see, e.g., Palomino and Prat, 2003) are not always feasible. The
main difference to the delegated portfolio management literature that does study
adverse selection is that, in the principal-agent set-up specific to banks, screening
is more feasible as the bank is more likely to move first in the contract offering,
whereas contracting in a delegated portfolio management setting is more likely to
give rise to a signalling problem (as in Das and Sundaram, 2002). Nonetheless, the
seminal contribution by Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) justifies screening by
treating a principal like a large consortium of investors, who can set the terms of
the contract.
Bénabou and Tirole (2013) also analyze compensation from a screening point of
view, but instead of skill focus on the banker’s intrinsic motivation to work as the
central quality. They find that, if bankers can divide their time between a socially
valuable task and a more monetarily rewarding task, competition on the labour
market can skew the offered contracts in such a way that the bankers shift their
attention away from the valuable task. The paper closest to the present is the one
by Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart (2012), which models a labour market for traders of
varying skill, yielding excessive risk in competitive markets. However, the authors
model the labour market in a Hotelling type of model, in which bankers’ distances
to their prospective employer matters, rather than the potential productivity of
bankers (as in the present paper, proxied by the size of banks).
1.2 Model: Exogenous Reservation Utilities
In the first model, to get the basic intuition of the paper, I assume that good traders
exogenously have higher reservation utilities than bad ones. Though this could be
seen as a reduced form of the stylized banking labour market, which is presented
later in the paper, it is also not a strange assumption to make from the onset.
Aspiring bankers with higher skill levels could have better career options in other
sectors, or be more productive when self-employed. This section derives conditions
on the model parameters under which excessive risk is taken.
Players There is one monopolist principal, the bank (she) who needs to hire an
agent, the trader (he), to invest in a financial asset. The bank needs precisely one
trader to be able to invest. Hiring more traders will not give any more profits, as the
bank only has a limited budget available for trading. There is a countably infinite
set of traders, each with a privately known type ϑ ∈ Θ = {B,G}. I refer to these
1As is demonstrated by Crédit Suisse’s Partner Asset Facility, cf. for example the article by
Richard Beales (2008) in the New York Times
2Such as French president Nicolas Sarkozy, cf. the article by Perrine Créquy (2009) in Le Figaro
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two types as bad and good. Only a finite subset of these traders is good, reflecting
the assumption that trading skill is an exceedingly rare quality.
The assumptions on the number of traders needed by the bank are markedly
different from those in some other papers (Bannier, Feess, and Packham, 2012;
Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart, 2012; Bénabou and Tirole, 2013). In these papers, banks
hire both good and bad bankers and have both self-select into a type of contract and
a corresponding level of risk. This makes sense for banks that engage, for example,
in loan origination, where every banker potentially makes an additional profit for
the bank that outweighs his wage costs. However, this paper tries to capture the
typical situation at proprietary trading desks of investment banks and hedge funds,
where small teams are in charge of these institutions’ entire trading budget for a
given asset class. These teams do not hire more traders, despite a large pool of
applicants aspiring to be part of them. Adding traders to these teams will not be
beneficial to the bank, as the potential revenues of these teams are constrained first
and foremost by the budget they have available for trading.
The bank offers every trader a menu of compensation contracts until one of them
accepts it. The trader, upon observing the offers, chooses either to accept one of
the contracts or not to accept any of them. If the trader rejects, he obtains his
reservation utility, uϑ. I assume that uB < uG. For now, this difference is taken
as an exogenous feature of the model: talented traders might have better career
prospects in other sectors, or be more productive when self-employed. However,
this difference can also be regarded as a reduced form of competition on the labour
market for traders; this difference can stem either from heterogeneity in bank size
(Thanassoulis, 2011) or quality (Bannier, Feess, and Packham, 2012), or from banks’
limited access to dispersed managerial talent (Bijlsma, Boone, and Zwart, 2012). In
the next subsection, I will give an extensive form game in which the size differences
between banks endogenously lead to differing reservation utilities.
The bank is risk neutral and does not face any cash constraints. All traders have
the same utility function over wealth with Bernoulli kernel u(·). I assume that u(·)
is strictly increasing and weakly concave. None of the players discount future cash
flows. I denote by w(·) the inverse of u(·).
Investment opportunities After accepting the contract, the trader chooses an
investment. Following Diamond (1998), the model specifies a set of three different
possible outcomes {L,M,H} , with H > M > L = 0. An investment X is a random
variable taking values in this outcome set and can, as such, be represented by a
triple (P(X = L),P(X = M),P(X = H)) . Bad traders can only invest in risk-free
assets (I will generalize this later on), whereas good traders have an investment
opportunity set that can be indexed by a single parameter σ, taking values in a
compact nonnegative real interval Σ, with 0 ∈ Σ. This investment opportunity set
contains the assets {
XGσ := (1− σ − g(σ), g(σ), σ) : σ ∈ Σ
}
.
The parameter σ can be interpreted as a risk parameter. Note, however, that σ
does not denote the standard deviation of the outcomes. The function g is non-
increasing and g(0) = 1, so that both types of traders have access to a risk-free
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asset. Furthermore g′′(·) < 0 and there is a σ inside Σ for which the expected pay-





holds. This also easily allows the characterization of inefficiently risky assets (σ >
σ∗) and inefficiently prudent ones (σ < σ∗). It can be useful to think of the outcomes
“low”, “middle” and “high” as being with respect to a benchmark. In that case the
risk-free asset represents an investment replicating a benchmark index or a market
portfolio, whereas a higher σ investment represents an active trading strategy.
Contracts Contracts can be based only upon the outcome of the trader’s invest-
ment and not on the choice of σ. The non-contractibility of σ, and the unobservability
of the trader’s type, means that contracts need to be designed to serve two distinct
purposes: to align the risk preferences of the principal with those of the agent, and
to screen the types of traders. Any contract consists of three wage levels wL, wM and
wH . Throughout the subsequent analysis, I will characterize the contracts in terms
of the corresponding utility levels uL, uM and uH . The bank can offer any menu of
contracts, as long as the null contract is part of this menu. However, the outcomes
do not change substantially if the bank is only allowed to offer one contract besides
the no-trade option.
Before analyzing the screening and risk incentive constraints, I make one addi-
tional assumption: before the outcome of the investment is realized, the trader can
engage in wasteful trades that lower this outcome. This entails that the compen-
sation contract always needs to be non-decreasing in the outcome of the trade, as
otherwise the agent has an incentive to engage in wasteful behaviour. This mono-
tonicity requirement translates into the two constraints uH ≥ uM and uM ≥ uL.
Constraints As previously stated, the contract between the principal and the
agent affects the agent’s incentive to reveal his type, but also affects the risk he
chooses. This imposes a number of constraints, which will be formulated on uL, uM
and uH . As the amount of risk σ cannot be observed and is freely chosen by the
agent, the principal faces the agent’s risk incentive constraint, namely that the level
of risk σ̃ that the agent ultimately chooses satisfies his best response correspondence:
σ̃ ∈ argmax
σ
{σ (uH − uL) + g(σ) (uM − uL) + uL} , (1.2)





In order to motivate the good trader to accept the contract, his participation con-
straint must be satisfied, which can now be expressed in terms of σ̃:
σ̃ (uH − uL) + g (σ̃) (uM − uL) + uL ≥ uG. (1.4)
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In order to make sure bad traders do not accept employment, the reward they get
from accepting employment and investing in the risk-free asset must be below their
reservation utility, giving the non-participation constraint
uM ≤ uB. (1.5)
The bad trader will then choose not to accept employment, but rather enjoy his
outside option.
The trader’s risk incentive constraint allows the condition for excessive risk taking
to be written directly in terms of the convexity of the compensation contract. As
g′ (·) is decreasing, σ̃ is greater (smaller) than σ∗ if and only if g′ (σ̃) is smaller















Limited liability If the trader is protected by limited liability, this translates
into a minimum level of utility β that must be provided, adding the constraint
uL ≥ β. The value β represents the lowest possible utility the principal must make
sure the agent obtains. One could think about this as the utility corresponding to
a minimum wage or to no wage at all. Alternatively, one could think of this as the
utility corresponding to the maximum punishment the bank can exert on the trader
by firing him, damaging his reputation and career prospects, or even pressing legal
charges, if that is feasible.
1.2.1 First Best
In case the trader types can be observed, the bank can simply reject bad traders and
just offer a contract to good traders. If the bank pays the trader a flat wage, the
trader is indifferent between all different types of investments and we can assume
that he chooses the optimal asset σ = σ∗. In this case the moral hazard problem
is irrelevant. The good trader earns his reservation utility and the bank earns the




she needs to pay the
trader.
1.2.2 Without Limited Liability
As stated previously, when the types of the traders are unobservable, the bank needs
to set wages in such a way that only a good trader accepts employment. In order
to do so, the bank needs to set a low payment in case of a medium return on the
investment. In order to attract the good trader, she can set a high reward for a
high return on the investment, knowing that this only makes the contract more
attractive to the good trader. If the trader is not protected by limited liability, the
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bank can punish a bad performance as severely as she wants, and thus has a means
to discipline the trader into not taking excessive risk. Thus, the bank optimizes his
expected profits
σ̃ [H − v (uH)] + g (σ̃) [M − v (uM)]− (1− g (σ̃)− σ̃) v (uL) ,





The following constraints are needed to ensure the participation of the good trader,
and the non-participation of the bad trader:
σ̃ (uH − uL) + g (σ̃) (uH − uL) + uL ≥ uG
uM ≤ uB.
Finally, the problem must satisfy the monotonicity constraints uH ≥ uM ≥ uL.
Solving the bank’s problem, the following result obtains.
Proposition 1.1. If the trader is risk neutral, then
• the good trader obtains his reservation utility and the bad one does not accept
employment,










• the chosen level of risk is equal to the optimal level of risk: σ̃ = σ∗.
If the trader is risk averse, then
• the good trader obtains his reservation utility and the bad one does not accept
employment,
• the chosen level of risk is lower than the optimal level of risk: σ̃ < σ∗.
The first part of this proposition is quite straightforward: since the trader is
risk neutral, the bank does not need to insure the trader, and as she can freely set
uL, she can perfectly align the trader’s incentives with her own. The second result
is essentially a risk-sharing result: because of the screening, there needs to be a
variable wage structure, but then the trader faces risk. The optimal solution weighs
the trader’s risk premium, which is a cost to the bank, against the profits that can
be made from taking more risk.
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1.2.3 With Limited Liability
If the trader is protected by limited liability, the bank cannot freely punish bad
performance, making it harder to discipline the trader into not taking too much risk.
As will be shown later on, in case good traders demand a much higher wage with
respect to the limited liability level than bad traders do, the screening problem can
lead to such a convex wage schedule that the bank can only be sure to hire the good
trader if he lets him take excessive risk. In this case, the principal’s optimization
problem remains virtually the same, only with the added constraint that uL > β. If
β ≥ uB it becomes impossible to screen out bad traders. I will leave this possibility
aside and focus on the cases in which β < uB.
One can derive sufficient conditions under which risk taking is excessive without
solving the bank’s problem: the participation and non-participation constraints,
together with the limited liability constraint, impose a minimum convexity on the
trader’s rewards. From the good trader’s participation constraint, we have
uH − uL ≥
1
σ̃
(uG − uL − g (σ̃) (uM − uL)) ,
so that we can bound the trader’s best response correspondence in the following
way:










As uG > uB ≥ uM ≥ uL ≥ β, the above expression implies that
g (σ̃)− σ̃g′ (σ̃) ≥ uG − β
uB − β
. (1.7)









then σ̃ > σ∗.
Proof. Note that






This means that if condition (1.8) holds,
g(σ̃)− σ̃g′(σ̃) ≥ g(σ∗)− σ∗g′(σ∗),
which, because of the concavity of g(·), implies that σ̃ > σ∗. QED
The intuition behind this proposition is that if the difference between the limited
liability constraint and the bad trader’s outside option is rather low, the difference
between the compensation in case of a medium investment return and the compen-
sation for a bad performance of the investment will be very small. If at the same
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time the good trader commands a very high wage, the bank needs to set a very
high reward for a good performance to still make it attractive for him to accept
employment. These two effects together will lead to such a convex wage schedule
that the hired trader ends up taking excessive risk. Note that it is also implicitly
assumed that it is better to hire the good trader and have him invest in the risky σ̃
asset, rather than to hire the bad trader and have him invest in the safe asset, i.e.,
that
σ̃ (H − (w(uH)− w(uL))) + g(σ̃) (M − (w(uM)− w(uL)))− w(uL) ≥M − uB.
When analyzing the bank’s optimization problem, one also finds that, in case of









, the good trader takes a risk σ̃ such that
g(σ̃)− σ̃g′(σ̃) = uG − β
uB − β
.
The intuition behind the above lemma is that, as σ̃ is necessarily in the ineffi-
ciently risky region, raising risk will both make it more expensive for the bank to
pay the risk-averse trader and make the expected return on the asset lower. Thus,
it is optimal to have σ̃ as low as possible.
The two sides in condition (1.8) have interesting interpretations. The left hand
side is the ratio of wage premia: the numerator specifies how much the good trader
needs or wants to earn above the absolute minimum, while the denominator repre-
sents the same quantity for the bad trader. The right hand side of condition (1.8) is
the expected gross revenue of the optimal asset, normalized by M . As M is also the
expected revenue of the risk-free asset, the RHS of (1.8) can also be interpreted as
the discounted expected return on the optimal risky asset. Alternatively, it repre-
sents the ratio between the expected revenues of the two traders’ respective optimal
assets.
1.2.4 Enlarging the Bad Trader’s Investment Opportunity
Set
Enriching the model slightly, I now assume that the bad trader has a larger set
of investments available than just the risk-free one, i.e., both types have a set of
available assets that can be indexed by a single parameter σ, taking values in a
compact nonnegative real interval Σϑ, with {0} ⊂ ΣB ⊂ ΣG. Again, the good trader
has access to the set of assets{
XGσ := (1− σ − g(σ), g(σ), σ) : σ ∈ ΣG
}
,
and the bad trader to{
XBσ := (1− σ − b(σ), b(σ), σ) : σ ∈ ΣB
}
.
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Both functions b(·) and c(·) are decreasing and convex, with b(0) = g(0) = 1 and
b(σ) < g(σ) for all σ ∈ ΣB \ {0}. This means that, for any positive level of risk, the
good trader has strictly better investments available than the bad trader.
How difficult it becomes to select only the good trader depends on the bad
trader’s investment opportunity set: in order to screen out the bad trader, the bank
now faces the non-participation constraint that, for all σ ∈ ΣB,




{σ (uH − uL) + b(σ) (uM − uL) + uL} ≤ uB. (1.10)
This maximization has a corner solution if b′(0) + uH−uL
uM−uL
≤ 0, in which case it boils
down to the old uM ≤ uB, meaning that a solution (σ̃, uH , uM , uL) to the previously-
studied problem (with ΣB = {0}) will still be the solution to the problem with the
richer investment opportunity set as long as b′(0) ≤ g′(σ̃).
If, however, b′(0) ≥ g′(σ̃), the old solution no longer holds: the bad trader would
have an incentive to accept the contract and invest in a risky asset with σ > 0. In
that case, the bank’s optimization problem is still to maximize
σ (H − (w(uH)− w(uL))) + b(σ) (H − (w(uH)− w(uL)))− w(uL),
where the good trader’s participation constraint
σ (uH − uL) + g(σ) (uM − uL) + uL ≥ uG





still hold. The bad trader’s non-participation constraint then becomes
σB (uH − uL) + b(σB) (uM − uL) + uL ≤ uB





Solving this problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but note that it imposes a
stronger constraint on the convexity of the wage schedule. Indeed, deducting the bad









Noting that the right hand side of the equation is greater than
uG−uB
uB−β
, and filling in
the expressions from the incentive compatibility constraints gives
g(σ̃)− σ̃g′(σ̃) ≥ uG − uB
uB − β
+ b(σB)− σBb′(σB).
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As b(·) is convex, b(σB) − σBb′(σB) > b(0) = 1, so that the right hand side of this
inequality is strictly greater than
uG−β
uB−β
. This implies that the lower bound on the
risk in this case is sharper than in the model with ΣB = {0}: as it becomes harder to
distinguish between the bad and the good trader, it becomes more likely that very
high-powered incentives are needed to be sure that the good trader is hired. On the
other hand, as should be noted, making the bad trader better will both raise the
expected revenue the bad trader can earn for the bank and make it more expensive
to hire the good trader. Thus, if the quality of traders is nearly indistinguishable,
it becomes more attractive not to screen and just hire the “bad” trader.
1.3 Model: the Banking Labour Market
In order to analyze how the differences in reservation utilities arises endogenously, I
model a very stylized labour market in which there are “small” and “large” banks.
Again, every bank only needs one trader, but big and small banks differ in the size
of the budget that this trader will be managing. In this context, an investment bank
with considerable proprietary trading activity will be “bigger” than a commercial
bank with a similar balance sheet size. The good trader’s talent at making profitable
investments will be more lucrative if the trader has a larger budget to invest. As a
large bank gets more out of hiring the good trader than a small one, large banks will
be willing to pay more. I will be focusing primarily on equilibria in which large banks
hire good traders, and small banks hire bad traders. However, as small banks are
also willing to pay more for good traders than for bad ones, good traders command
a wage premium from the large banks. This wage premium can lead to excessive
risk taking in much the same way as before.
The contracts, and the resulting levels of risk, are dependent upon the precise
rules of the labour market. In order to study this, I provide two very stylized types
of labour markets : a less flexible one and a more flexible one. In the less flexible
labour market, all banks offer their contracts to the different traders; a trader simply
observes all contracts on offer from the different banks, and chooses the one that he
prefers, or chooses to exercise his outside option. In a more flexible labour market, a
trader can, after being hired by one bank, still choose to go and work for a different
bank. This means that, in an equilibrium in which large banks hire good traders,
being hired by a large bank conveys a trader’s quality. This makes it more attractive
for small banks to hire good traders, as they no longer have to deal with screening
out the bad traders when they make a predatory offer on a good trader. This further
drives up the good trader’s rent, imposing stronger constraints on the contract that
the large bank has to offer the good trader. I will go on to show that this leads to
higher risk taking.
Between the two versions of the labour market model, the only difference lies
in the timing of the contract stage. In both versions, all traders have a reservation
utility u. There are N + 1 banks, i = 0, 1, . . . , N , with respective sizes J := I0 >
I1 = I2 = . . . = IN =: I. I assume that I ≥ u, so that it is profitable for the
smaller banks to hire a bad trader to invest in the risk-free asset. There is a large
number T > N of bad traders and just one good trader. On the preferences and
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the investment opportunity sets of the traders I make some simplifying assumptions:
the bad trader has only the risk-free asset available and the good trader has the set
of assets {
XGσ = (σ, g(σ), 1− σ − g(σ)) : σ ∈ ΣG
}
available, where g(σ) = 1 − α
2
σ2, for some positive α. I also assume M = 1 and











Both traders are risk neutral, so that u(·) and w(·) are the identity.
1.3.1 The Less Flexible Labour Market
In order to model a less flexible labour market, I assume that a trader, once he has
accepted a contract, will start working for that bank until his investment returns
are realized and the game ends. At the contracting stage, all banks offer contracts
(uH , uM , uL) to all the traders, upon which these traders decide to accept or reject.
If multiple traders accept the contract of a bank, a trader will be assigned at random.
Note first of all that the fact that T is greater than N guarantees that all banks will
employ a trader in equilibrium, as any bank that ends up without a trader would
have an incentive to deviate by hiring an unemployed bad trader.
Now, assume that in this model equilibria exist in which the large bank hires
the good trader and all the other banks hire the bad ones. In that case, there is
a constraint for the large bank to offer the good trader such a high wage that the
smaller banks prefer to hire a bad trader and have him invest in the risk-free asset.
Thus, the large bank must offer an expected utility ū to the good trader that makes
it unattractive for smaller banks to lure away the good trader.
In order to see what this utility is, I first take any given outside option ũ for the
bad trader, and then see what a small bank’s profit V (ũ) would be from offering a
compensation package that offers a minimum utility of ũ. That is to say, if another
bank were to offer a compensation package worth ũ to the good trader, V (ũ) repre-
sents the maximum profit a small bank could get from topping that offer and hiring






























(uM − uL) + uL ≥ ũ.
As a small bank would still need to screen out the bad trader, in this optimization
problem she is bound by the same constraints as before. The first constraint is
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the non-participation constraint that keeps bad traders from taking the contract;
the second is a limited liability constraint. The third constraint is the incentive
compatibility constraint that the trader chooses the optimal level of risk given the
compensation package, and the fourth is an individual rationality constraint.
The individual rationality constraint is always binding. With respect to the other
constraints, the problem allows corner solution or internal solutions, dependent upon
the parameters of the problem: as before, the limited liability and non-participation
constraints then impose a minimum convexity in the payment schedule for the trader.
If these become binding, this means that the bank is restricted in the risk level it
can let the trader take. If these constraints do not bind, the bank can freely give the
trader the incentives to take the optimal investment decision and implement σ = σ∗.








I − ũ if ũ−β












I − ũ if ũ−β




Now if the large bank wants to be sure that the small banks cannot hire the good
trader, she must offer him an expected utility so high that the small banks would
rather hire a bad trader and invest in a risk-free asset than try to top the good bank’s
offer. This means that the large bank needs to offer an expected utility ū such that
the small bank’s expected profit from topping the offer, V (ū), is not greater than
what she would obtain from hiring the bad trader, V (ū) ≤ I − u. The best ū is the
smallest one satisfying this criterion. As V (·) is decreasing and continuous, ū solves
the equation V (ū) = I−u. This equation then gives the following expression for the















if u− β < I.
(1.11)
Assuming β > 0, one has that u ≥ I and the smaller banks would not be able to
pay the bad trader to invest in the safe asset.
Now we can address the optimization problem for the large bank. In order not
to lose the trader to a small bank, she needs to provide the good trader with at least
u. The large bank still needs to screen out bad traders, so that when she determines













(uM − uL) + uL ≥ ũ.
In an exercise similar to the one in Section 1.2.3, one finds that the good trader
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which, because I > ū−β, is necessarily greater than H2
2α
. This implies that the large
bank can only be sure to hire the good trader if she offers a compensation package
that induces excessive risk.
The next question is whether this strategy is profitable for the large bank, and
especially whether it pays more than hiring a bad trader and investing in the risk-free
asset. As the following lemma states, this is always the case.
Lemma 1.4. If β ≥ 0 and I ≥ u, the large bank hires the good trader and the small
banks hire bad traders. The good trader subsequently takes an excessive risk of
σ =
2I




The intuition behind this lemma is that, if the small bank is indifferent towards
hiring the trader, giving him ū as well as letting him take excessive risk on the one
hand, and hiring the small trader and having him invest in the safe asset on the
other (which is the definition of u), the large bank will be even more willing to hire
the good trader and have him invest in a profitable, but excessively risky asset. This
means that if the opportunities to punish the trader in case of a bad outcome are
relatively limited, then excessive risk taking is an inherent feature of this model.
1.3.2 The Flexible Labour Market
I model a more flexible labour market by letting the banks offer their contracts
sequentially to the different traders. As the hiring decision by the large bank is the
most interesting in this context, I assume the banks offer their contracts in numerical
order. If the trader accepts the contract, his employment at the large bank and his
contract terms become verifiable information, but the trader keeps the real option
to take the offer from another bank and renege on earlier offers.
I am still interested in equilibria in which the large bank gets the good trader.
However, in these equilibria, upon knowing which trader has been hired by the good
bank, other banks will rationally infer that this trader must be the good one. These
banks can then offer this good trader a targeted contract, without needing to screen
out bad traders. This entails that it becomes cheaper for the small banks to offer
an undercutting contract, thus driving up the good trader’s rent.
In this case, we can repeat the exercise we did before. However, now knowing the
good trader’s type, the small bank no longer faces the non-participation constraint.
This means that, for any expected utility ũ that the large bank offers, the small

















(uM − uL)− uL
}
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(uM − uL) + uL ≥ ũ.
This problem is relaxed with respect to the one studied in the previous subsection:
the constraint that screens out the bad traders is no longer present. In a sequential
equilibrium in which the large bank gets the good trader, the other banks can
infer with certainty which trader is the good one. Noticing that the participation
constraint is binding, and that, in making the contract, there is freedom to choose
uH , uM , and uL in such a way that σ = σ








Thus, in order to make sure that the smaller banks do not want to give a predatory
offer to the good trader after he accepts employment, the large bank must offer the
trader an expected utility of at least






The good trader’s rent is thus exactly the incremental profit he could earn the small
bank, with respect to the bad trader.












(uM − uL) + uL ≥ ũ.













Again, the trader necessarily takes excessive risk. In this case, the bank will make














36 Essays on Competition in Banking
1.3. MODEL: THE BANKING LABOUR MARKET
In order to see if these equilibria are possible, it is necessary to compare the expres-
sion with the expected profit that the bank makes from hiring the bad trader. A
quick look at this expression reveals that if I > 4(u − β), the above expression is
smaller than J−u, and the large bank is better off hiring a bad trader and obtaining
a profit of J − u. So, assume now that 1
4
I ≤ u− β ≤ I. In that case, the large bank


























J ≥ u− u.
As u− u = H2
2α










This gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1.5. Assume 1
4
I ≤ u − β ≤ I. If condition (1.12) is satisfied, a subgame
perfect equilibrium exists in which the large bank hires the good trader, the small








In both types of labour markets, this paper finds excessive risk taking. Focusing on
the equilibria in which the large bank hires the good trader, the risk taken in the
less flexible labour market equals
σLF =
2I





u− β + I
σ∗,












Note that both are increasing in I
u−β : if I increases, i.e., when small banks are
relatively big, they are willing to pay more for good traders. This drives up good
traders’ rent and thus the risk that the large bank must allow the good trader to
take. Similarly, when u − β is very small, the reservation utility of bad traders
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is relatively low, and the limited liability constraint is relatively high, so that it
becomes harder to screen out bad traders and punish bad performance at the same
time.
Since u − β < I by assumption, it can be seen that σF > σLF > σ∗: excessive
risk is taken in both types of labour markets, but more so in the flexible one than in
the non-flexible one. In the more flexible labour market, it becomes more attractive
for the small bank to make a predatory offer to the good trader, thus driving up the
good trader’s rent. This observation carries the strongest regulatory consequence:
making the labour market more flexible will drive up the rents of good traders, and
thus lead to higher risk. A regulator intent on reducing risk in the financial sector
could thus introduce measures to make the labour market less flexible. All of the
equilibria above are constrained efficient, so that taxes or bonus caps cannot make
the outcome more efficient; however, a regulator could intervene by introducing
tighter regulation in the financial labour market.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I find that incomplete information on trader skill can lead to excessive
risk taking: good traders demand a wage premium, and the only way banks can
separate them from bad traders is by offering a high upside bonus. This leads to
overly high-powered incentives, and thus to excessive risk taking. The wage premium
that leads to excessive risk taking can be modeled as an exogenous feature, arising
from better outside options for good traders, but can also arise as an endogenous
result of competition on a labour market. The nature of the labour market has
an impact on the level of risk that traders end up taking: in more flexible labour
markets, the threat of traders leaving for other firms raises the price of good traders,
so that they need to be given more high-powered incentives than in less flexible
labour markets. It can thus be argued that regulators have the option of making
labour markets less flexible in order to reduce excessive risk taking by large financial
institutions.
A meaningful welfare analysis is not possible in this model, as only banks and
their workers are present in the model. This model therefore overlooks two types of
externalities. First of all, the bank’s risk taking can impose a negative externality on
bondholders and depositors, as well as, for the more systemically important banks,
on the financial system. The other type of externality is on the real sector: if banks
hire very talented workers, these workers will not be productive in the real sector.
A more complete analysis of welfare should take this into account. This model, if
depositors or financial contagion are introduced, could be used to study whether
intervening in bankers’ pay provides an efficient policy tool to mitigate the first type
of externality.
It deserves further study whether this model, especially that of the labour market,
can still be analyzed in a tractable manner if preferences are generalized. It would
be especially interesting to see to what extent the excessive risk taking result would
persist with risk-averse traders.
In this model, investment technologies and prices have been treated as exoge-
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nous. An interesting question would be to see how the pay-off structure of bankers
influences asset prices. The framework in this paper could be adapted to involve an
asset market, in order to see whether certain stylized facts of financial markets can
be explained by bankers’ incentives.
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Chapter 2
Credit Market Competition and
Liquidity Provision
co-authors: Fabio Castiglionesi and Fabio Feriozzi1
They clashed together when they met and then at that point each
turned about and rolled his weight back again, shouting: ‘Why
hoard?’ and ‘Why Squander?’
Dante Alighieri, La Divina Commedia, Inferno, Canto VII 2
Cash holdings by firms have seen a dramatic increase over the past decades
(Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Duchin, 2010). At a practical level, the propensity
of firms to hold on to their liquid resources is puzzling since there are no clear reasons
as to why firms would find it convenient to sit on an increasing pile of low-return
cash. In the theoretical literature, the incentives to hold (or provide) liquidity have
been studied mainly within the context of exclusive contracting relationships. That
is, the borrower can only trade with one lender, either a monopolist or one from a
competitive pool of lenders. In this framework, an exogenous change in competition
(from a monopolist lender to a competitive one, or vice versa) does not affect firm
liquidity holdings.
This paper tries to approach the issue of liquidity provision to firms in a novel
manner. It considers the role of non-exclusive relationships in a generic model of
investment and liquidity à la Holmström and Tirole (1998). If contracting between
firms and lenders is exclusive, it is optimal for a lender to guarantee a limited
provision of liquidity to the firm to provide for cost shocks that might arise before
the firm’s project matures. However, if it is possible for a firm to privately contract
with several investors at the same time, other investors could expand this liquidity
1Fabio Castiglionesi is currently an associate professor at the Finance Department at Tilburg
University in Tilburg, The Netherlands. Fabio Feriozzi currently works as an assistant professor of
finance at IE Business School in Madrid, Spain.
2Translation D. Sinclair. In the original, these lines read
“Percoteansi ’ncontro; e poscia pur
si rivolgea ciascun, voltando a retro,
gridando: ”Perche tieni?” e ”Perche burli?””
41
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT MARKET COMPETITION AND LIQUIDITY
provision by free riding upon the provision given by incumbent lenders. This means
that it becomes harder, if not impossible, to limit the liquidity provision to the firm.
In Holmström and Tirole (1998), our main benchmark, a firm has a profitable
project, but will face a stochastic liquidity shock before the project matures. This
liquidity shock takes the form of a cost that needs to be paid in order for the project
to be carried out and its payoff realized. The firm will contract with investors to
obtain the resources needed for the initial investment, but will also secure a liquidity
guarantee. Under exclusive contracting, the size of this liquidity provision is the one
that optimally weighs the potential cost that needs to be paid against the benefit of
being able to carry the project to maturity.
Contracting the liquidity provision ex ante is optimal because the firm has only
a limited capacity of refinancing due to a moral hazard problem that causes a wedge
between pledgeable income and total income. The constrained first-best allocation
can be implemented by contracting a finite maximum amount of liquidity that the
firm can withdraw, and a flat repayment to the lender. The latter is needed to
guarantee the firm a large enough share of its project’s final proceeds in order to
make sure the firm exerts effort.
When competition between lenders is assumed to be non-exclusive, i.e., when
lenders are not able to verify the relations between the firm and other lenders, a
problem with the finite liquidity provision arises. As the liquidity needs of the firm
are private information (as in Holmström and Tirole, 2011), the exclusive compe-
tition allocation provides an incentive for outside lenders to deviate. An outside
lender can offer some additional, and optional, liquidity provision to the firm. If the
firm accepts, and finds itself needing the additional liquidity, it can privately under-
state its liquidity needs to the incumbents and use the additional liquidity from the
outside lender. If the additional liquidity provision is needed, the deviating lender
can receive a payment from the firm’s original incentive share.
This deviation means that the original Holmström and Tirole (1998) allocation
can no longer be sustained. As a next step, we try to characterize the equilibria that
do arise when competition is not exclusive. In particular, assuming outside lenders
have the possibility to fully dilute the original lender, we show that an equilibrium
can be found in which an incumbent lender provides unlimited liquidity support
to the firm. This makes it impossible for the outside lenders to free ride, and it
allows the incumbent to regain exclusivity. To motivate our analysis, we briefly
document how since the late 1960s it has become increasingly common for firms to
have several banking relationships (see, among others Braggion and Ongena, 2011).
As we try to argue in this paper, this historical shift towards non-exclusivity could
have consequences for the economy as a whole. As a particular example, consider
the United Kingdom. After the deregulation in the British banking market, there
has been a rise of multiple banking relationships from the late 1960s through the
early 1980s (Braggion and Ongena, 2011). This rise is accompanied by an increase
in firms’ aggregate cash holdings, as shown in Figure 2.1.
The results in this paper point towards a channel through which a shift from
exclusivity towards non-exclusivity could induce a higher liquidity provision (and
therefore possibly higher liquidity holdings). It might be necessary for lenders to
provide a firm with more liquidity in order to ward off competition from outside
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one relationship (left axis)
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Sources: Braggion & Ongena (2010),
Cambridge DTI Databank
Figure 2.1: Graph of cash holdings and relationship multiplicity in the UK
lenders. Clearly, more evidence is needed, but this is the basic observation that
motivates our model.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the literature. Then,
section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3 describes the allocation in autarky,
that is, when there are no outside investors. Section 2.4 solves the model for the
benchmark allocation under exclusive competition (Section 2.4.1) and monopoly
(Section 2.4.2). Section 2.5 presents the analysis under the assumption of non-
exclusive competition, where we show how the benchmark allocation under exclusive
competition is not sustained in equilibrium (Section 2.5.1) and we characterize the
alternative equilibrium allocation (section 2.5.2). Section 2.6 concludes. Proofs for
this chapter are in Appendix A. Appendix B shows how the main results still hold
if the model considers a game with a finite, but large enough, number of players.
2.1 Literature
A growing literature describes the inefficiencies caused by non-exclusivity in the pres-
ence of adverse selection (Beaudry and Poitevin, 1995; Attar, Mariotti, and Salanié,
2011, 2014) or moral hazard (Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992; Kahn and Mookherjee, 1998;
Parlour and Rajan, 2001; Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004; Attar and Chassagnon, 2009; At-
tar, Casamatta, Chassagnon, and Décamps, 2010; Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2013).
The literature so far has mainly focused on firm solvency issues, while our focus is
on firm liquidity provision.
A common finding in the literature is that non-exclusivity leads to less lending
and trading, and in particular non-exclusivity brings under-insurance (Kahn and
Mookherjee, 1998) (Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004). This paper instead presents an ex-
ample in which non-exclusivity induces over-insurance: lenders are willing to provide
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unlimited liquidity support to prevent free riding by other lenders. Lenders can free
ride on one another’s liquidity provision, thus extending the liquidity supply to the
firm. An unlimited liquidity support thus serves to regain exclusivity. As far as we
are aware, this is the first example of over-insurance under non-exclusivity.
In much of the literature, liquidity or cash holdings are explained using practi-
cal, and firm-specific, reasons, giving cross-sectional predictions about differences in
liquidity holdings. Our paper instead explains changes in liquidity holdings through
the overall nature of competition, which is something that typically happens outside
the firm: this could give a possible explanation of the fact that build-ups in liquidity
often seem to happen across the board, rather than at the level of individual firms.
2.2 Model
The model is a non-exclusive competition equivalent to the model of liquidity de-
mand in a generic lender-borrower relationship (subject to moral hazard) as intro-
duced by Holmström and Tirole (1998), and extensively treated in Tirole (2006,
Section 5.3) and in Holmström and Tirole (2011, Chapter 2). The model describes
a three-period production economy. There is a single good used for both consump-
tion and investment, which will be referred to as “money”. There are two kinds of
players: firms and lenders. All players are risk neutral and do not discount future
consumption.
Firm and projects. There is a firm, protected by limited liability, with a finite
endowment A at t = 0. The firm has access to a project, with constant returns to
scale, that can be either successful or unsuccessful. The success of the project is
revealed at t = 2. For an investment of I units of money at t = 0, the project yields
RI at t = 2 when successful and 0 when unsuccessful.
The firm can influence the success probability of the project by privately choosing
a level of effort e ∈ {L,H}. If the firm chooses low effort e = L, it obtains a private
benefit B and the project will have a success probability equal to pL > 0. If the firm
chooses high effort e = H, there will be no private benefit, but the project will have
a higher success probability equal to pH . We have 0 < pL < pH ≤ 1. We denote the
difference in the success probabilities by ∆p = pH − pL.
The present value of the project (conditional upon continuation) when the firm
exerts high effort is defined as
ρ1 := pHR. (2.1)
This present value gives the total expected surplus that can be generated by the
project if it is continued after t = 1. In order to induce the firm to work, its share
of the final project’s return has to be higher than the potential benefits of shirking,
i.e., given an up-front investment I and a repayment D to the lenders, we need
pH(RI −D) ≥ pL(RI −D) +BI. (2.2)
This constraint allows us to define the expected pledgeable income (conditional upon
continuation) as the maximum income per unit of investment that can be pledged
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This pledgeable income is the maximum amount, in expected value and conditional
upon continuation, that an investor can expect to receive from the firm. This amount
will be useful when analyzing the possibility of credit rationing. In terms of this
pledgeable income, the incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
pHD ≤ ρ0I. (2.4)
The liquidity shock. At t = 1, before the effort choice is made, there is a rein-
vestment stage at which the firm observes an exogenous liquidity shock ϑ. This
liquidity shock is a nonnegative random variable drawn from a continuous, atomless
and strictly increasing distribution F (·) with density f(·). A liquidity shock ϑ, when
the investment size equals I, means that a total cash injection of ϑI is needed in
order to continue the project. If this cash cannot be raised, the firm is liquidated,
yielding zero. If this cash can be raised, the project will continue. We assume that
there is no possibility of continuation at a smaller scale.
Lenders. Lenders have an unlimited amount of money at t = 0 and t = 1 and
can provide money to the firm to finance investment in the project. Throughout the
main text, in order to develop the most important intuitions, we treat the lending
sector as subject to free entry: contracts are offered simultaneously, but we assume
that in any equilibrium, there is at least one inactive lender. Appendix B formally
describes a game with a finite number of lenders.
Contracts. The contracting stage occurs at t = 0. In this stage each lender can
offer a contract to the firm. The contract Ci is an array (Ji, Li, Di (·)), that specifies
three elements:
• the up-front amount Ji to finance the initial investment in the project;
• the liquidity policy function Li(·) that determines the liquidity provision at
t = 1. Upon learning the shock ϑ, the firm sends a message mi(ϑ) about the
liquidity shock to each lender i ∈ S and the function Li(·) maps each message
into an amount of liquidity that lender i provides to the firm;
• the repayment function Di(·) that is a function of the message mi that the
firm sends to lender i.
The firm can send different messages to each of the lenders and each message mi
can not be seen by anyone but the firm and lender i. The strategy of the firm at
t = 1 is thus a vector of messages in the space MS. It is assumed that the space
of messages M is of the same dimension as the space of potential liquidity shocks
(i.e., M is one-dimensional). As the lender can only respond to the message with
the amount of liquidity provision and the repayment amount, any more dimensions
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added to the message space would be redundant. One can think of the message as
a report of ϑ or just a demand for an amount of liquidity, i.e. Li(mi) = mi.
The set of lenders with whom the firm trades is called the set of active lenders
and denoted by S. The free-entry assumption translates into the assumption that
no matter how large S, there is always an inactive lender who can offer a contract
on top of those that have already been traded. The choice of S determines, among
others, the firm’s total aggregate investment size I = A +
∑
i∈S Ji. It is assumed
that the total amount I, i.e. all the money borrowed from the lenders, has to be
invested in the firm’s project.
We assume that the firm does not have any consumption or investment oppor-
tunities at t = 1, so that any liquidity withdrawn at t = 1 in excess of the firm’s
liquidity need is wasted. This justifies the assumption made in the Holmström and
Tirole (1998); Holmström and Tirole (2011) and Tirole (2006) models that firms do
not withdraw more liquidity than needed, even if incremental cash at t = 1 is sold
at a very low marginal price. In case of a continuous distribution of shocks, and a
non-decreasing price of liquidity, this entails that the firm does not withdraw more
liquidity than needed: ∑
i∈S
Li(mi) ∈ {0, ϑI} . (2.5)
For continuous shock distributions one can assume, to the same effect, that, al-
though the liquidity needs cannot be observed, the post-shock holdings of the firm
can be. In that case, lenders can punish the firm for having a liquidity position
that is too high. The post-shock cash holdings equal
∑












ϑI. Therefore the lenders can prevent the firm from withdrawing more than it needs,
so that the firm faces the additional constraint (2.5). In other words, the firm can
either withdraw exactly the amount it needs, if the liquidity facilities are sufficient,
or not withdraw any liquidity.
As argued in Holmström and Tirole (1998); Holmström and Tirole (2011), and
Tirole (2006, Section 5.3), the specific form that these contracts can take may vary.
A straightforward interpretation is a combination of start-up financing and a credit
line. However, these contracts can also be interpreted as a combination of initial
financing and an amount of cash that is provided up front. This up-front cash can be
accompanied by covenants and provisions on the level of cash holdings.3 Of course,
a combination of credit lines and cash provided up front is also possible.
It is not possible for the lenders to write any contingency upon the contractual
relationship the firm has with other lenders. This makes it more complicated to
define concepts like seniority, or to differentiate between debt, equity, and hybrid
claims. Throughout most of the analysis it is assumed that lenders write plain debt
contracts. The firm’s cut of the project’s proceeds takes the form of an equity claim.
Timing. The firm’s effort choice comes after the reinvestment stage. The timeline
of the model can be seen in Figure 2.2.
3The standstill agreement between Kirk Kekorian and Chrysler in February 1996 shows that
cash holdings can be limited contractually and court-enforced.

























Figure 2.2: Timeline for the basic model
Parameter assumptions. First of all, we assume that there are gains from trade:
the project, given that the firm exerts high effort, has a positive ex ante net present
value (NPV) , i.e., there exists a ϑ̃ such that




For a liquidity level ϑ̃, the left hand side represents the expected total surplus gen-
erated per unit invested, whereas the right hand side represents the total cost of the









This means that, for any level of liquidity, the total cost of the project is always
greater than the total expected amount that can be pledged to outside investors.
This means that there is credit rationing. Otherwise, the firm would be able to
borrow an infinite amount of funds for its project. Another assumption is that, if
the firm exerts low effort, the total NPV of the project will never be positive. That
is, for all ϑ̃,
















This function weighs the costs and benefits of providing more liquidity. The nu-
merator gives the expected cost (per unit of investment) if liquidity is provided up
to ϑ̃. The denominator gives the benefit of providing liquidity: the probability of
being able to finance the liquidity shock and having the project yield a return. As
a general property, for any continuous distribution F (·), the function c(·) has a
unique local and global minimum at ϑ∗, where ϑ∗ = c(ϑ∗) and has two asymptotes:
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= 1 + Eϑ <∞. Using these properties of c (·)
allows us to re-state assumptions (2.6) and (2.7) in the following concise form:
ρ0 < c(ϑ
∗) < ρ1.
A typical graph of the function c(·) is shown in Figure 3.1.
ϑϑ∗
c (ϑ)
Figure 2.3: Typical shape of the expected unit cost of investment function
Aggregate allocation. In order to analyze the aggregate quantities, we indicate
with ϑ the maximum liquidity shock that the firm can finance at t = 1. Note that
it is possible for ϑ to equal infinity. The interpretation of ϑ̄ is the total liquidity
position of the firm. This is the combination of available cash and the total of












The highest level of liquidity that can still be secured in exchange for an incentive-
compatible repayment is denoted by
ϑ := max{ϑ : pHD(ϑ) ≤ ρ0I}.
If pHD(ϑ) ≤ ρ0I everywhere, we define ϑ = ϑ.
2.3 Autarky
We begin the analysis under the assumption that the credit market is absent. Study-
ing the autarky case serves to determine the firm’s reservation utility. In autarky,
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the firm has two choices: either consume his endowment at t = 0, or invest part of
his endowment, keeping the rest in cash in order to insure the project. In the first
case, the total consumption equals the endowment A. In the second case, if the firm
invests a fraction γ of its own endowment A to start up the project, storing (1−γ)A
in cash to finance the possible liquidity shock in the intermediate period, the firm is
insured as long as ϑ < 1−γ
γ













By choosing to invest a fraction γ of its endowment and keeping a fraction 1− γ




decision whether or not to invest is dependent upon the profits it can obtain by
investing, as is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. Under autarky, the firm invests a fraction γA = A
1+ϑA
of its
endowment, where ϑA satisfies the first order condition







= (1 + ϑA) f (ϑA) (ρ1 − ϑA) , (2.9)













Regarding the part that is invested in the project, there is a level of γ for which
it is possible to obtain a revenue greater than one. This means that the firm will
always choose to invest at least part of its endowment in the project. On the other
hand, the firm must also keep at least some part of its endowment as a cash buffer,
as otherwise the project can never be realized. This means that choosing γ = 1 or
γ = 0 is never optimal and the firm’s problem always has an interior solution. The
firm’s autarky consumption UA serves as a reservation utility: in any equilibrium
allocation, the firm must receive at least UA, as otherwise it will be better off not
trading, but instead investing on its own.
2.4 Benchmark Allocations
We now characterize the two “exclusive” benchmark allocations. The first case
can be thought of as the “classic” competitive market and corresponds exactly to
the baseline solution in Holmström and Tirole (1998). The second consists of a
monopoly, in which the lending sector consists of only a single lender, who can make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm.
2.4.1 Exclusive Competition
In this section, we study the case of exclusive competition. Any lender can ex ante
enforce his contract to be exclusive, precluding the borrower from trading with other
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lenders. Alternatively one can assume that there exists some exogenous factor that
constrains the borrower to pick only one contract from the contracts offered. In
this case, whenever a lender offers a profitable contract, another lender can under-
cut this contract. This entails that, in equilibrium, lenders earn zero profits and
the profits for the firm are maximized. Thus, this case corresponds to the “classic”
notion of competition, and to the baseline case studied in Holmström and Tirole
(1998). The following proposition characterizes the exclusive competition alloca-
tion. Temporarily allowing for the results that the firm’s repayment is constant and
incentive compatible, the firm’s total gross surplus is characterized by the following
proposition:




F (ϑ∗)(ϑ∗ − ρ0)
,
a flat incentive-compatible repayment such that pHD
C (ϑ) = ρ0I
C for all ϑ, and a
maximum liquidity provision ϑC = ϑ∗.
The complete proof is provided in Appendix A. The explanation of the result is
as follows. Because of competition, the total surplus of the project goes to the firm
and must be maximized. First of all, as the surplus generated under low effort is
lower than that generated under high effort, there is no reason to have any state of
the world in which the incentive compatibility constraint is violated and in which
the firm provides low effort. Furthermore, as a higher repayment raises the financing
capacity of the lender, and the surplus increases with investment size, the incentive
compatibility constraint must be binding. To see why ϑC must equal ϑ∗, consider
the the optimal allocation, characterized by an up-front investment IC = A+ JC , a



























With both constraints binding, one can reduce the optimization to one over the the







raising the liquidity level has two effects: on the one hand, it raises the probability
of being able to finance the liquidity shock and thus augments the expected return
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per unit invested. On the other hand, it raises the total expected cost per unit
of investment, thus tightening the financing capacity of the lender and the total
project size that can be financed. The optimal level of liquidity is thus the one
that ideally weighs the costs of providing insurance against the benefits. Indeed




is minimized, i.e., when ϑC = ϑ∗. Because ϑ∗ minimizes
c (·), by assumption (2.6), there are gains from trade. This means that the firm is
always better off with an outside investor: under autarky the firm always has at least
part of its capital remain unproductive. This means that the individual rationality
constraint of the firm is always satisfied under the exclusive competition allocation.
2.4.2 Monopoly
When the lending sector is monopolistic, there is only one lender, who makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm. In this case, the lender will maximize its profits,
subject to the firm’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
The result is very similar to the one under exclusive competition:




F (ϑ∗)(ρ1 − ρ0)
,





IM , and a maximum liquidity
provision ϑM = ϑ∗.
The intuition is as follows. By a similar argument as in the previous paragraph,
the repayment is constant and incentive compatible everywhere. The monopoly
contract can thus be characterized by an up-front investment IM = A + JM , a
repayment DM , and a maximum liquidity provision ϑM . The monopolistic lender











subject to the firm’s individual rationality constraint
pHF (ϑ
M)(RIM −DM) ≥ UA, (2.11)





IM . As was shown
in the previous paragraph, there is always an allocation that is individually rational
for both the lender and the firm, so that the lender can obtain nonnegative prof-
its, while satisfying both the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility
constraint of the firm. With similar arguments as in the previous paragraph, the
incentive compatibility constraint is always binding. So is the firm’s individual ra-
tionality constraint, as the lender does not want to leave any surplus to the firm on
top of its reservation utility. Plugging these two constraints into expression (2.10),
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and therefore the optimal level of liquidity
provision under monopoly minimizes the function c(·), so that ϑM = ϑ∗. That is, the
monopolistic lender efficiently weighs the costs and benefits of providing liquidity
to the firm. Comparing the allocation under exclusive competition to the monopoly
allocation, it can be noted that both the repayment as a fraction of total revenues
and the relative liquidity level are the same. However, comparing the investment
sizes, one can see that the investment size under monopoly is strictly smaller than
the one under exclusive competition: IM < IC . The intuition behind this is as
follows: the lender can obtain at most the pledgeable income from the project and
has to supply the total cost of the project (minus the firm’s fixed endowment). Then,
by the credit rationing assumption (2.7), the costs per unit invested are higher than
the revenue that the lender can obtain per unit invested. This means that the
lender’s profits are decreasing in investment size. However, in any allocation, the
firm receives an amount at least equal to its potential private benefits, meaning that
the firm’s utility is increasing in total investment size. Thus, under monopoly, when
the lender’s profits are maximized, the project size must be as small as possible, and
under exclusive competition, where the firm’s profit are maximized, the investment
size must be as large as possible.
2.5 Non-Exclusive Competition
We now leave the situation in which competition is simply assumed in reduced
form, as in Section 2.4.1. Rather we choose to model competition explicitly as a
non-exclusive phenomenon: firms can privately choose to contract with multiple
lenders. First, we show that, once competition is assumed to be non-exclusive, the
benchmark allocation as derived under exclusive competition is no longer sustained
in equilibrium. Second, we characterize an alternative equilibrium in such an envi-
ronment.
2.5.1 Impossibility of the Benchmark Allocations
In both benchmark cases, the optimal contract consists of a certain amount of ini-
tial investment I, a finite liquidity provision policy ϑ∗, and a flat and incentive-
compatible repayment D. However, there are problems with this allocation in a
non-exclusive environment, as stated by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4. In equilbria satisfying some refinement criteria as specified in the
appendix4, the exclusive competition allocation with
I =
A
F (ϑ∗)(ϑ∗ − ρ0)
,
with ϑ̄ = ϑ∗ and with pHD(ϑ) = ρ0 for all ϑ, cannot be sustained.
4This refinement amounts to a form of trembling-hand perfection over the contract acceptance
decision by the firm.
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The formal proof is in Appendix A. The intuition of the result is as follows.
In the exclusive competition allocation, the firm obtains a positive share of the
revenue. An entrant can provide the firm with additional liquidity (i.e., on on top of
ϑ) in exchange for the firm’s share of the revenue.5 Upon accepting this additional
liquidity, the firm can now also continue if ϑ < ϑ ≤ ϑ + ∆ϑ, by raising ϑ from the
active lenders and up to ∆ϑ from the entrant. The entrant finds it profitable to
make this offer up to an amount ∆ϑ as long as the expected revenue from receiving
the firm’s share (given that the firm uses the facility and provides low effort) exceeds










Notice that the deviation considered above is possible irrespective of the size of
the investment. This implies that the deviation cannot be prevented by covenants
on or monitoring of the investment size. In the model without liquidity shocks,
some effects of non-exclusivity can be mitigated by appropriate covenants Attar,
Casamatta, Chassagnon, and Décamps (2010). However, in the present economy,
even if the investment size could be imposed ex ante, the result of Proposition 2.4
would still hold.
Proposition 2.4 shows that with non-exclusive competition, the possibility that
the firm has the ability to understate its liquidity needs at t = 1 turns out to have
an important implication. Under exclusive competition, truth telling was trivially
satisfied because the firm had no incentive to underreport its type and no possibility
to overreport it. Under the deviation in Proposition 2.4, the deviating lender can
offer additional liquidity support by free riding on the support by the active lenders.
The firm can still access the original liquidity facilities by underreporting its type
to the active lenders in the states of the world where this is needed. In these states
of the world the deviating lender reduces the total surplus from the project, but he
externalizes the losses to the other lenders.
2.5.2 Equilibrium
This section deals with establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the non-
exclusive setting, and deriving its characteristics. By an equilibrium in this free-
entry model we mean any set of traded contracts under which there is always an
inactive lender, and no inactive lender has an incentive to offer another contract. In
order to analyze the equilibrium, we introduce two further assumptions:
Assumption 1: Observability of the project size. In a model without a
liquidity shock, the size of the project reveals ex post to the lenders whether or
not the firm has contracted with other lenders. We assume that after t = 0, the
total size of the project can be observed and used as a contracting variable. As is
documented in Attar, Casamatta, Chassagnon, and Décamps (2010), observability
of the project size can mitigate some of the inefficiencies caused by non-exclusivity.
5Legal restrictions can exist on the possibility of a manager to sell his stake in the firm. Yet,
even if the manager cannot sell his stake, he can dilute it by issuing more debt.
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In their paper, the lender has only limited means to punish the firm in case the
firm has attracted additional funds from other lenders. The presence of the liquidity
shock gives lenders an additional disciplining device as lenders are now able to cut
the firm’s liquidity supply in case the firm has attracted too much initial funding.
Note, however, that ϑ and the various Li still cannot be used in contracts. The
idea is that the project size I corresponds to the actual size of the firm’s assets and is
thus easily verifiable. As a balance sheet item, it is easy to verify in court. However,
it is possible for the firm to hide additional cash flows, for example by obtaining
supplies in kind, by using off-shore transactions, or by using derivative structures.
In order to deal with this contractual contingency on I, a slight abuse of notation
needs to be introduced. The contracts now specify, besides the same Ji, the functions
Li(·, ·) and Di(·, ·) that depend on both the message sent by the firm and the total
investment level. On the aggregate level, we denote by D(ϑ, I) the lowest level of
debt that guarantees a liquidity injection of ϑI, and by ϑ(I) the maximum liquidity
shock that can be withdrawn, for a given level of investment I. We still indicate
the equilibrium quantities with D(ϑ) and ϑ.
Assumption 2: Strategic default. In order to build the equilibrium it is impor-
tant to specify whether or not the firm can strategically default, i.e. assume a greater
total debt load D(·) than the total potential revenue of the project RI. We assume
that this kind of strategic default is possible. If the total debt load can exceed the
revenue from the project, the question is how this total revenue is divided among
the creditors in case the firm is bankrupt. We assume the pro rata distribution of
the debt claims among the various creditors, weighted by the size of the claim. No
creditor can impose seniority.
We denote by D̂i(·) the amount of repayment lender i gets in equilibrium as a
function of the realized liquidity shock, and we have
D̂i(ϑ) =
{
Di(mi(ϑ)) when D(ϑ) ≤ RI
Di(mi(ϑ))
D(ϑ)
RI when D(ϑ) > RI.
Given that strategic default is possible, the firm is free to choose as high a debt level
as possible. This means that, in any continuation equilibrium, the only constraint
on the liquidity shock that can be financed is the total possible supply of liquidity.






The assumption of pro rata sharing in case of bankruptcy implies a possibility
for dilution that exacerbates the result of Proposition 2.4. Independently of the
repayment, an entrant can always dilute active lenders, making a finite liquidity
provision impossible. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5. Under Assumption 2, any allocation with a finite ϑ cannot be
sustained in equilibrium.
The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A. The intuition is as follows.
For any finite level of liquidity, there is a corresponding total debt load. A deviating
lender can enter the market and offer some more liquidity in exchange for a repay-
ment that only has to be paid if the firm uses the additional facility, as in the proof
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of Proposition 2.4. The difference here is that, no matter what the current total
debt level D(ϑ), the entrant can set a repayment that is high enough to dilute the
existing creditors. Under the assumption that every creditor is treated equally, the
active lenders cannot prevent this deviation.
Because of Proposition 2.5, the liquidity supply to the firm must be unlimited in
any equilibrium. This means, however, that if an entrant increases the project size
without offering additional liquidity insurance, the firm could still get full insurance.
However, by Assumption 1, incumbent lenders could prevent such behaviour from
entrants by conditioning the contract on the observed investment size.
Proposition 2.6. Assume ϑ∗ − pLR ≥ ∆ppL . If one lender, say lender 0, offers the
contract (J0, L0(·, ·), D0(·, ·)) with
J0 =
A




m0I if I = A+ J0






)I if I = A+ J0
RI if I 6= A+ J0,
then there is no profitable deviation for the entrants.
The proof is in Appendix A. The result can be understood by first of all noting
that the liquidity shock gives the lender an additional way in which it is able to
punish the firm for seeking additional up-front investment. The threat by the lender
of cutting off the liquidity supply makes it possible for the firm to commit to not
seeking up-front investment from any of the other lenders. Similarly, because of the
already unlimited liquidity supply, the firm has no reason to seek additional support
from outsiders. This contract sees the lender break even, so there is no way for an
entrant to undercut lender 0’s offer.
We can now establish the condition under which there are gains from trade with
an infinite liquidity provision. This will make it possible to characterize the existence
of an equilibrium. We have the following.
Proposition 2.7. Assume ϑ∗ − pLR ≥ ∆ppL and
(ρ1 − ρ0)A
(1 + Eϑ)− ρ0
≥ UA; (2.12)
then, there exists an equilibrium allocation with trade and infinite liquidity provision.
The formal proof is given in Appendix A. The intuition behind this result is as
follows: because of Proposition 2.5, we are focusing on equilibria with an unlimited
liquidity supply. The inequality (2.12) provides the condition for such an equilibrium
to be feasible: if it is satisfied, lenders can provide unlimited liquidity insurance and
still break even, all the while providing a utility of at least UA to the firm. This
means that there can be an allocation that is individually rational for both the firm
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and the lender(s). The contract mentioned in Proposition 2.6 then constitutes a
strategy for one lender to finance the firm and provide unlimited liquidity support.
We are now ready to synthesize all of the above results into one main proposition,
that states the existence of an equilibrium, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium
allocation:
Proposition 2.8. Assume the conditions for Proposition 2.7 are met; then, there is
an equilibrium under non-exclusive competition and any equilibrium is characterized
by the aggregate allocation (I, ϑ,D) with
I =
A










Note that lenders break even in this allocation, and, given that liquidity support
must be unlimited, the firm’s utility is maximized. This proposition follows intu-
itively from the results above. As was already established in Proposition 2.7, there is
an equilibrium with an infinite liquidity provision. Because of Proposition 2.5, any
equilibrium must be characterized by an infinite liquidity provision. Furthermore,
because of the possibility of entrants undercutting any allocation that leaves a profit
to the lenders, the firm’s utility must be maximized, subject to the familiar incentive
compatibility and break-even constraints, but now with the added constraint that
liquidity provision must be unlimited.
When comparing this result to the benchmark of exclusive competition, it can
first be noted that 1 + Eϑ = limϑ→∞ c(ϑ) > c(ϑ
∗) = ϑ∗, so that 1 + Eϑ − ρ0 >
ϑ∗ − ρ0 > F (ϑ∗) (ϑ∗ − ρ0), which gives
I =
A
1 + Eϑ− ρ0
<
A
F (ϑ∗) (ϑ∗ − ρ0)
= IC .
As the total cost of financing per unit of investment size is higher under full insurance
than it is under optimal insurance, lenders will be able to finance only a smaller
investment. By the very definition of the competitive allocation, the surplus then
generated is the maximal, given the investor’s break-even constraint and the firm’s
incentive constraint. This means that the surplus generated in the equilibrium
under non-exclusive competition, satisfying those same constraints, generates a lower
surplus. Indeed the surplus generated under non-exclusive competition equals
(ρ1 − ϑ∗) I =
ρ1 − ϑ∗
1 + Eϑ− ρ0
A,
and the surplus generated under exclusive competition equals
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which, as 1 + Eϑ > ϑ∗, is greater than the non-exclusive surplus.
Under monopoly, the total investment size was
UA
F (ϑ∗) (ρ1 − ρ0)
=: IM ,
giving an expected total surplus under monopoly of




Now, if Assumption (2.12) holds,
I =
A





So the total surplus generated under non-exclusive competition, (ρ1 − ϑ∗) I, still
exceeds the total surplus under monopoly. A comparison between I and IM is
not straightforward to make, but we can conclude that, in case a full-insurance
equilibrium under non-exclusive competition exists, the total surplus generated will
be between the monopoly surplus and the exclusive competition surplus.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze a model of non-exclusive competition among lenders that
provide investment and liquidity support to a firm. The paper highlights a new and
interesting channel through which non-exclusivity can help to explain an increase in
firm liquidity holdings. Indeed, the increasing multiplicity of bank-firm relationships
seems to have been a forerunner of the build-up in cash holdings. It is important to
notice that our paper takes a very generic view of liquidity: our aggregate variable
representing liquidity can represent the up-front provision of liquid securities or an
insurance in the form of credit lines. Clearly the former translates directly in higher
cash holdings, while the latter does not necessarily affect them.
Nonetheless, our interpretation of the equilibrium with unlimited liquidity sup-
port is that it will, at least partly, be implemented through higher cash holdings.
This is particularly true if lenders cannot commit to providing credit lines. Con-
cerns about the difference between cash holdings and credit lines (as in Acharya,
Davydenko, and Strebulaev, 2012) point to a second channel through which non-
exclusivity leads to higher cash holdings. As a general result, the free-riding problem
under non-exclusivity lowers the NPV per unit of investment, as the optimal liquid-
ity policy is not implementable. This reduces the scope for trading between lenders
and firms, forcing more firms to self-insure against liquidity shocks. This leads to a
shift from credit lines towards cash holdings, increasing the liquidity that firms need
to hold.




and the Need for Financial
Intermediation
The bank is something more than men, I tell you.
John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath
Banks, and other financial intermediaries, play an important role in bringing
capital from investors to entrepreneurs and households in any advanced economy
around the world. The reason why banks are needed as a middle-man has been
debated by economists. This paper aims to provide a novel rationale for the existence
of bank-like financial intermediaries: banks arise as an institution to coordinate
competition between investors.
In addressing the raison d’être of financial intermediation, three arguments stand
out in the literature. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) document how it is optimal
for investors to pool the choice of the maturity structure of their investments if
they face uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Diamond (1984) argues how
if several investors invest in the same company, every one of them will have an
incentive to shirk away from monitoring, making it optimal for investors to delegate
monitoring to a single institution. Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that
the possibility of bank runs disciplines banks into not extracting rents when rolling
over an investment, thereby improving efficiency ex ante.
In this paper, intermediaries are necessary as an institution to coordinate the
flow of capital from investors competing in a non-exclusive and uncoordinated fash-
ion to borrowers. Competition is non-exclusive in the sense that investors can neither
observe nor control the contracts that borrowers have with other investors. Competi-
tion is uncoordinated in the sense that if several investors finance the same borrower
together, they cannot coordinate on the contracts that each one of them trades with
that borrower.
This paper features a simplified Holmström and Tirole (1998) type model of
investment: borrowers have access to a project that requires an initial fixed invest-
ment, pays off at a later date and is subject to a liquidity shock at an intermediate
date. Under optimal contracting, investors provide money to the borrower for the
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initial investment and set a maximum level up to which the liquidity shock can be
financed at the intermediate date. In exchange for their investment, they ask for a
repayment from the project’s proceeds at the final date.
This paper finds an explanation for the presence of intermediaries by describing
an economy that cannot reach an equilibrium if investors and borrowers can only
contract directly with one another. This is illustrated by first restricting investors
in this economy to only deal with borrowers directly, and vice versa. Under this re-
striction, because of the non-exclusive and uncoordinated nature of the contracting,
a two-sided free-riding problem arises. On the one hand, a similar problem as in
Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi (2013) is present: for any finite credit line that
incumbent investors provide, outside investors can free-ride upon this provision and
offer an additional “emergency” liquidity provision. They can do so by diluting the
incumbent investors in the states of the world where this additional liquidity provi-
sion is used. This problem ultimately makes it impossible to limit the intermediate
date liquidity provision.
On the other hand, if liquidity support is unlimited, various investors have to
provide liquidity together, as the shock might exceed the limited endowment of each
individual investor. The potential expected repayment that the borrower can offer
remains limited. This means each investor has an incentive to change the pricing
of his liquidity provision in such a way that the other investors are responsible for
providing liquidity, thus investing and not insuring, free-riding on the insurance
others are providing.
These two free-riding problems make that there is no equilibrium under the
restriction that banks and borrowers can only contract directly with one another.
In order to circumvent this double free-riding problem, an institution can coordinate
investment by collecting money from investors and using it to invest in and provide
liquidity insurance to borrowers, thus acting as an intermediary. This paper will
discuss how such an institution can either be implemented by a social planner or
arise endogenously trough contracting between investors, effectively making one or
more investors intermediaries. This intermediary can use the pooled resources of
several investors to fully insure the firm’s liquidity shock, and is thus not susceptible
to free-riding by investors increasing the liquidity supply.
One investor becomes the intermediary for others and thus the sole entity directly
trading with a company. This dynamic is related to a common observation in the
economic history literature: in the latter half of the nineteenth century, especially in
Germany1, and, to some extent, in the United States, financing by large (universal)
banks has played a pivotal role in the development of areas like mining, railroads,
utilities, and heavy industries. This paper models production technologies that
require some initial investment and face potentially high, yet initially uncertain,
costs or reinvestment needs at a later date. Thus, I aim to capture precisely the
salient features of technologies that played a role in these areas: after investment,
development costs are still uncertain and in case of a technical failure or unexpected
cost overrun, it is next to impossible to scale down operations. In this paper, it is
indeed assumed that if a borrower cannot face its intermediate date liquidity needs,
1In the literature review I will give more references to papers discussing the role of bank financing
in industrial development
60 Essays on Competition in Banking
it needs to abandon the project, yielding a liquidation value of zero.
For already established banking markets, this paper could shed light on consoli-
dation and concentration in the banking sector. Recent merger waves in the 1990s in
the US (Calomiris, 1999; Calomiris and Karceski, 2000) and in the 1980s and 1990s
in Europe (Karceski, Ongena, and Smith, 2005; Boot, 1999) have been studied,
mostly from an efficiency perspective. This paper could shed light on how increased
international and domestic competition, new technologies, and deregulation might
have precipitated these concentration movements. If it became easier for banks to
compete over financing the same firms, then by the mechanism described in this
paper, banks would have needed to pool their investment together. This pooling
would allow them to circumvent the non-exclusivity and common agency problems
arising from many smaller banks competing with one another.
Similarly, a banking sector with multiple banks competing should develop “in-
termediaries for intermediaries”. Thus, the model in this paper can be applied to
understand the origin of investment banking, and, more recently, the rise of syn-
dication and originate-to-distribute models of banking. In most syndicated deals,
a group of banks appoint one bank as the lead arranger, who is also in charge of
credit lines to the firm receiving the loan. This lead bank thus becomes an incidental
intermediary for the others in a dynamic not dissimilar to the one described in this
paper. In the originate-to-distribute model, one bank originates loans for particular
borrowers, and re-sells them to other investors, including other banks.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the two problems leading to market failure under
direct contracting between borrowers and investors fall into two distinct, but related
categories: on the one hand, there is an exclusivity problem and on the other hand,
there’s a common agency problem. The exclusivity problem stems from the inabil-
ity of the borrower to commit to only contract with a given number of investors
without seeking additional trade with other investors. The common agency problem
stems from the fact that multiple investors are needed to finance one borrower and
there exist contractual externalities between different investors financing the same
borrower.
The exclusivity problem is of the nature of those documented in Bizer and De-
Marzo (1992) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991): in a large class of allocations, there are
potential gains from trade between the agent (the borrower) and a possible entrant,
in which the entrant imposes a negative externality on the incumbents. Specifically
following Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi (2013), in this paper there is no possi-
bility to limit the liquidity supply to the borrower, as potential entrants can always
extend the liquidity supply on top of what is already offered.
The need to provide the borrower with unlimited liquidity leads to the fact that
in order to finance the borrower, multiple investors are necessary. This situation,
with one agent and multiple principals is referred to as common agency. As has been
shown both with moral hazard (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) and with adverse
selection (Martimort and Stole, 2002), the contractual externalities in these common
agency situations are such that the resulting contracts differ substantially from those
in classical single principal-single agent situations. In this paper, the common agency
problem is similar to the one described in Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013): although
all investors have an interest in seeing the borrower continue, each one also has an
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interest in the other ones providing the funds for the borrower to do so, so that
each one will try to adjust its contract with the borrower in such a way that others
provide more liquidity.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows: section 3.1 reviews the related literature.
Section 3.2 presents the model and its basic assumptions. The main intuitions of
the model are treated in an example in section 3.3. Section 3.4 then proves the no-
trade results for a more general model. Section 3.5 describes how intermediaries can
restore trade. Section 3.6 discusses the robustness of the model’s most important
implications to different modeling assumptions. Section 3.7 concludes and presents
some ideas for further research. Formal proofs of the main results can be found in
Appendix C.
3.1 Literature
This paper models financial intermediaries as a means to overcome two types of
externalities between investors. To make a very blunt classification, these sorts of
externalities fall within the type commonly studied in the common agency literature
on the one hand, and the non-exclusivity literature on the other. Even though
these two literatures are very similar and closely related at a theoretical level, the
common agency literature tends to deal with situations in which an agent finds
himself contracting with multiple principals, whereas the non-exclusivity literature
deals with situations in which the agent could contract with several principals.
In the classic literature on competition with asymmetric information it is often,
implicitly or explicitly, assumed that agents only deal with only one of many prin-
cipals. The competitive mechanism of principals undercutting each others’ offers
would then lead to a solution that is optimal for the agent, only constrained by
the relevant moral hazard or adverse selection problems. However, as Pauly (1974)
notes, the possibility of agents privately contracting with several counterparties at
the same time leads to equilibria that are inefficient also with respect to the con-
strained optima, as those constrained optima can leave room for a private trade
between the agent and non-incumbent principals. These trades would then impose
externalities on incumbent lenders.
In economies with moral hazard, potential gains from trade between the agent
and outside principals are possible, as the outside principals can externalize the
incentive effect of their contracts. In insurance economies (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1991; Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004; Attar and Chassagnon, 2009), trade can be restored
by latent contracts. (Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992) model a consumption economy in
which a borrower can sequentially approach multiple banks. Under the constrained
optimal contract, the borrower has an incentive to approach other banks.
A different problem stemming from non-exclusivity in economies with moral haz-
ard is documented in the papers by Parlour and Rajan (2001) and Attar, Casamatta,
Chassagnon, and Décamps (2010): if an agent can choose contracts from multiple
principals, there is a problem with the classic Bertrand (1883) workings of compe-
tition. If one principal offers a contract that leaves him some rent, other principals
do not want to undercut, as the agent might be induced to accept both the first
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contract and the undercutting contract. This gives equilibria in which one principal
can extract up to monopoly rents, as no other principal can undercut him if he does.
Another strand of the non-exclusivity literature focuses on adverse selection.
Attar, Mariotti, and Salanié (2011) and Attar, Mariotti, and Salanié (2014) study
how markets with adverse selection work in the presence of private contracts between
agents and multiple principals. This adverse selection can also start playing a role at
an intermediate date, after contracts have been agreed upon: Boxtel, Castiglionesi,
and Feriozzi (2013) document how firms receiving liquidity support from different
investors want to contract additional lines of liquidity support, thus giving that
any limited level of liquidity provision leads to potential deviations from outside
investors. This mechanism also plays an important role in this paper.
Very closely related, and on a technical level very similar, is the literature on
common agency: situations in which an agent contracts bilaterally with multiple
principals at the same time and the principals impose indirect externalities on each
other through the incentive effects of their contracts. Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
model an economy with moral hazard. As providing incentives through a contract is
costly, each principal will want to other principals to provide the incentives, leading
to a free-riding problem. Martimort and Stole (2002) and Peters (2001) look at com-
mon agency situations with adverse selection and find that the revelation principle
found in single-principal mechanism design problems does not hold in multi-principal
settings. A very practical common agency problem close to the one in this paper is
discussed in Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013).
This paper aims to address the formation of large bank-like intermediaries as the
most common instrument in an economy to get funds from investors to firms. The
economic history literature has noted some times and places where banks started
playing an exceptionally large role. Especially in Germany in the late 19th and early
and 20th centuries, large universal banks dominated the financing of German firms.
The special relation between German banks and industrial firms has been noted by
contemporaries (Jeidels, 1905; Riesser, 1910). In a seminal analysis, Gerschenkron
et al. (1962) states that
...the German banks, and along with them the Austrian and Italian
banks, established the closest possible relations with industrial enter-
prises. A German bank, as the saying went, accompanied an industrial
enterprise from the cradle to the grave, from establishment to liquidation
throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence.2
He argues that it was the presence of large universal banks, or Großbanken that
allowed the German economy to mobilize enough capital for the second industrial
revolution and to “catch up” with the more industrialized economy of the United
Kingdom.
This “Gerschenkron hypothesis”, that universal banks with a great deal of cor-
porate control were needed especially to mobilize capital in order to rapidly indus-
2This echoes an earlier quote by Jeidels (1905) of the same gist: “The banks attend an industrial
undertaking from its birth to its death, from promotion to liquidation, they stand by its side whilst
it passes through the financial processes of economic life, whether usual or unusual, helping it and
at the same time profiting from it.”
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trialize the relatively backward German economy3 has afterwards been extensively
discussed, refined, and reinterpreted. Da Rin (1996) reinterprets the important role
of universal banks in Germany as being focused on information, in monitoring, con-
trol and coordination of investment. Da Rin and Hellmann (2002) provide a formal
theoretical model of the big-push dynamics that underlie the Gerschenkron hypoth-
esis. Guinnane (2002) analyzes the development and role of all banks in Germany,
not just the Großbanken, in the 19th and early 20th centuries from the point of view
of delegated monitoring (cf. Diamond, 1984) and argues that German banks were
particularly apt at performing this task.
Numerous studies have compared the German experience to the experience in
other countries. During the American “Gilded Age” a number of large financiers,
the best known of which is J.P. Morgan, have played a pivotal role in financing
American industrialization. The financiers of the house of Morgan were often active
on the boards of directors of the firms they financed. DeLong (1991) finds that
firms with J.P. Morgan representatives on their boards were 20% more valuable
than those without J.P. Morgan men on their boards. Ramirez (1995) finds that
this difference is most likely attributable to liquidity issues. Having close ties to a
bank makes it easier for firms to raise funds in times of high liquidity needs. An
interesting case study is presented in Chandler (1954), focusing on the patterns of
railroad financing in the US: even though railroads were often equity financed, firms
relied on intermediaries to raise equity. Often larger equity-financed railroads ran
into liquidity problems, as one would expect from the analysis in this paper.
For all the similarities between American investment banking and German uni-
versal banking, differences are noted by Calomiris (1993, 1995). He argues that even
before the Clayton and Glass-Steagal acts of 1914 and 1933 respectively, the reg-
ulatory branching and activity restrictions on banks were such that the American
system performed significantly worse in financing industrial development.
The other comparison that is often made is between the United States and Ger-
many on the one hand, where bank financing played a relatively important role and
Great Britain on the other, where, according to Gerschenkron et al. (1962), banks
were “obsessive about liquidity and only lent on a short term, hands-off basis.” (cf.
Guinnane, 2002). Davis (1963) hypothesizes that industrial development in the U.K.
in the late nineteenth century started lagging behind that in the U.S. and Germany,
because the U.K. lacked the kind of large financial institutions that the U.S. and
Germany had. This difference in growth has been documented extensively in Lewis
(1978) and attributed by some scholars (such as DeLong, 1991) to the different
financial systems present in the different countries.
A few papers compare financing by universal banks to other forms of financing
within an economy. The aforementioned papers by DeLong (1991) and Ramirez
(1995) do so for the United States around the turn of the twentieth century. Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) compare firms in post-WWII Japan that have close
ties to so-called keiretsus, large financial conglomerates, to firms that lack these close
ties. They find that the former group of firms has a smaller sensitivity to liquid-
ity shocks, indicating that they are less liquidity constrained. Becht and Ramı́rez
3and that the even more backward Russian economy needed the even more draconian force of
centralized state planning.
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(2003) perform a similar exercise, looking at bank affiliation in Germany and find
that mining and steel companies with ties to universal banks were significantly less
liquidity constrained than non-affiliated firms.
As to the question why banks are needed in a financial system, two seminal ar-
guments stand out in the theoretical literature. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) state
that investors need banks in order to pool the uncertainty they have about future
liquidity needs. Pooling investments can lead to a better mix of liquid short-term
and profitable long-term investments than each investor individually optimizing his
investment over different horizons. Diamond (1984) provides another explanation:
investors need to perform the costly task of monitoring in order to mitigate infor-
mation asymmetries with borrowers. However, if other investors monitor already,
each investor is better off not expending the monitoring effort, free-riding on the
monitoring provided by others. Ultimately this means that everyone is better off if
one investor gets assigned to be a delegated monitor, intermediating for the other
investors.
This paper is closer to Diamond (1984) in the sense that it models the necessity
of banks from features of the borrowers’ investment technology. However, this paper
is substantially different from Diamond (1984) on a rather fundamental level. It is
the inability of both agents and principals to commit to contracts that causes inef-
ficiencies in this model. The technologies in this paper are exogenous, so a moral
hazard problem as in Diamond (1984) does not exist. Investors have no special
ability to overcome information asymmetries that exist between investors and bor-
rowers, be it through some costly monitoring expenditure or through learning about
the borrowers’ technology. This also makes a difference in terms of interpretation:
in Diamond (1984), banks perform the economically productive task of monitoring,
and centralizing this task to one party gives economies of scale. In this paper, how-
ever, intermediaries perform no productive task and are merely needed to overcome
contractual externalities between investors.
This special role assigned to banks is also present in Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), where banks distinguish themselves from other investors by their ability
to reduce moral hazard through monitoring. A similar ability often attributed to
banks is the ability to gain information over a relationship, thereby reducing ad-
verse selection. Rajan (1992) weighs off the costs and benefits of this informational
advantage: on the one hand, banks can use their informational advantage to extract
rents, but on the other it does allow for more efficient continuation and liquidation
decisions. Diamond and Rajan (2001) analyze how deposit-taking institutions, be-
cause of the possibility of runs, have the right balance sheet structure to mitigate
potential rent-seeking.
Another paper close to this one is the paper by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995),
that studies the trade-off between centralized bank financing and decentralized mar-
ket financing in a model with refinancing: banks might be inclined to refinance too
often and decentralized financiers do not refinance often enough. This, however,
takes place in a world where financiers cannot commit ex ante to refinancing or
not, and where refinancing costs are public information. Furthermore, the causal
interpretation is almost reversed. In Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), overinsur-
ance occurs because of bank financing, whereas in this paper, overinsurance occurs
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because of other reasons and banks are the only institution able to provide this
excessive insurance.
3.2 Model
This section introduces the full model. In order to prove the necessity of intermedi-
aries in this economy, I first restrict the agents, so that investors can only contract
directly with a borrower and vice versa. Under this restriction, no trade can take
place. Then I go on to show that with intermediaries, trade can take place. I do
this first for a simple example (section 3.3) to develop the intuition and then for the
more general model (section 3.4).
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and a single good, called money. All agents
are risk neutral and do not discount future cash flows. There is a large sector of
investors financing a single borrower. There is a single borrower and M investors,
with M > 1. The investors are indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . ,M and each investor has the
same endowment W . The assumption that there are multiple investors, but only
one borrower, guarantees that if contracting is exclusive, investors make zero profits
and maximize the borrower’s surplus.
Borrower and Projects The borrower has access to a project that requires an
input of money at two different dates: at t = 0 an initial investment is needed and at
t = 1 there is a liquidity shock. To keep the model simple, I assume that the initial
investment is fixed and requires I = 1 units of money. Furthermore, the borrower
cannot divert money or spend it on anything other than his project, so that any
money the borrower raises at t = 0 in excess of I, does not change his utility.
The liquidity shock is an exogenous cost that realizes at t = 1 and that needs
to be financed in order for the borrower to be able to continue the project. This
shock can be thought of as a repair cost after a technical failure or an investment
that is needed and of which the costs weren’t certain at the inception of the project.
If a firm cannot pay this liquidity shock, it cannot continue the project, i.e. there
is no possibility of scaling down if only part of the necessary funds can be raised.
This assumption is not unrealistic in heavy industries, where a technical failure of
one reactor, smelter, or blast furnace can shut down an entire production process.
Similarly, one could think of a mining project or a railroad, where natural obstacles
have to be cleared in order for the project to operate.
This liquidity shock is a random variable ϑ, drawn from a distribution F (·) with
density f(·), and with compact support Θ. If the borrower can raise ϑ, she will do
so in order to finance the project and if he can’t, the project has to be abandoned
and will yield zero. Following Holmström and Tirole (1998), I assume that there
are no investment or consumption opportunities at t = 1 and that the borrower
cannot divert cash, so any money withdrawn in excess of ϑ is wasted. The only
possible thing the borrower can do with excess liquidity is “burn” it, so that it only
matters for the borrower whether the total amount of cash he can raise is larger
than ϑ or not. I make this assumption both in the exclusive benchmark case and
in the non-exclusive case that is the topic of study in this paper. What happens
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when one relaxes this assumption, is studied in the exclusive context in Tirole (2006,
Chapter 5.3). However, to make the analysis clearer and to isolate the effects of non-
exclusivity and common agency in this context, I keep the simplified assumption.
If the project is continued, it will yield a transferable return R and a private
benefit B > 0. Both are fixed, given continuation. One could think of R +B being
the borrower’s total income, of which only R is pledgable, or, alternatively, of R as
the pecuniary return on the project and B as a private, non-pecuniary utility that
the borrower enjoys from operating the project, such as perk consumption, status
or experience. If the project is continued, the return and private benefit are not
dependent upon any action by the borrower, so that given continuation, there is no
moral hazard. The borrower has limited liability and B cannot be appropriated by
outsiders, so at t = 1, the firm would always rather continue than liquidate, even
if continuation entails bankruptcy. It is important to note that B does not play
the same role as the private benefit in the Holmström and Tirole (1998) framework:
given continuation, the return and private benefit are fixed and not dependent upon
an effort choice by the borrower.
On the distribution of ϑ, I assume that for every ϑ̃ < sup Θ, one has
P
(
ϑ̃ < ϑ < ϑ̃+ min(R,W )
)
> 0,
which means that for any level of the liquidity shock inside the range of possible
values, there are other values of the liquidity shock not “too” far away, which can
occur. For continuous distributions it is sufficient to assume that F (·) is increasing,
i.e. that there are no “holes” in the support of ϑ. I make the more general, and more
technical, assumption to be able to deal with discretely distributed shocks, which
I need in simplified examples. In popular terms, the general assumption allows for
holes in the support of ϑ, as long as they are not too big.
Contracts At t = 0, each investor i offers a contract Ci to the borrower. After
observing the contracts, the borrower chooses a subset I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,M} with whom
she trades. Each contract Ci is a triple consisting of
• an up-front transfer Ji from the investor to the borrower,
• a maximum liquidity provision Li, at t = 1. At t = 1, the borrower can
demand an amount of liquidity Li up to Li. It is assumed that the borrower
has no investment or consumption opportunities at t = 1 (as in Holmström
and Tirole, 1998), so that the borrower only cares whether or not the aggregate
amount of money it attracts is large enough to cover the liquidity shock, and
• a debt repayment Di(·) that can be a function of the demanded liquidity Li. In
any subgame perfect equilibrium, this function needs to be non-decreasing, as
otherwise the borrower would have an incentive to withdraw too much liquidity
in some states of the world, wasting the unnecessary amount.
Default and Bankruptcy The borrower is protected by limited liability. If the
borrower promises an aggregate repayment that exceeds R, a total of R has to be
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paid to the investors. Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the division of
the proceeds among creditors is pro rata, i.e. every investor obtains a share of the
proceeds weighed by the size of his own claim on the borrower’s t = 2 income.
This pro rata division makes it possible for investors to dilute one another and thus
to free-ride on one another’s liquidity provisions. However, this “dilution” could
also come from moral hazard (cf. Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi, 2013) or from
a speculative tranche of the borrower’s revenue. This, however, is not the main
concern here.
Notation In order to discuss equilibrium allocations, it is useful to develop some
notation for aggregate quantities. Denote by ϑ the maximum amount of liquidity
the borrower can obtain. For every ϑ ∈ [0, ϑ], one can now define D(ϑ), the total
debt repayment the borrower has to take on in order to finance a shock ϑ.





This assumption guarantees that there are enough investors to ensure free-entry-like
competition between investors. The liquidity shock possibly exceeds each individual
investor’s endowment:
sup Θ > Wi for all i, (3.2)
so that no single investor can offer full insurance to the borrower. Nonetheless, each
investor’s endowment is not too small, as it could provide financing and liquidity up
to a level that optimizes the total surplus from the project:








for all i. (3.3)
These assumptions reflect that even though each investor’s endowment is of a roughly
similar size to the borrower’s project, the potential costs that a project might run
up are relatively large. Note that as a direct consequence of these two assumptions,
sup Θ > R, so that under full insurance, the firm’s repayment capacity is smaller
than the maximum liquidity provision. This would imply that over at least some
range of values for the liquidity shock, the price that the firm pays for a marginal
unit of liquidity is smaller than one.
The ex post aggregate liquidity shock is bounded in such a way that the endow-
ments of all investors together suffice to provide full insurance to the firm:




This assumption says two things: first, there is abundant cash in the system, so that
market power in principle lies with the borrower. Second, aggregate risk is present,
but limited, so that even ex post there is no cash shortage. Ex ante, even with
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full insurance, the project generates enough expected pledgable income to recoup
expected costs.
R ≥ 1 + Eϑ. (3.5)
This means that there is no credit rationing, even when the project is fully insured.
Strategies and Equilibrium Concept The assumption is that investors play
pure strategies. In the version of the model where investors are restricted to only
directly trade with borrowers, contracts are offered simultaneously, after which all
borrowers can accept any subset of the offered contracts. Later on in this paper,
when I study intermediation, I will specify the timing of the contracting stage in
case investors are allowed to contract among each other. The equilibrium concept
for both versions of the model is subgame perfection.
3.3 Example
First, I offer a numerical example that conveys all the intuition of the general model.
Endowments and the Project There is a number M ≥ 2 of investors that is
large enough to satisfy all the assumptions of the general model. For each investor,
Wi = 5. The borrower’s project requires an initial investment of 1 unit and has a
liquidity shock that is either low, with ϑ = ϑL = 2, or high, with ϑ = ϑH = 6. Both
happen with equal probability. If the project is continued, the monetary return is
R = 5 and the private benefit is B = 1
2
.
Assumptions Now, I can verify whether all assumptions from the main text are
satisfied. First of all, two investors are already enough in the sense that condi-
tion (3.1) is satisfied. The maximum liquidity shock of 6 exceeds all investors’ indi-
vidual endowments, so that condition (3.2) is satisfied. I will check assumption (3.3)
when I look at the first best case in the next subsection.
The maximum total cost of the project, 1 + sup Θ, equals 7, so that the en-
dowments of the investors, equaling
∑M
i=1Wi = 5M ≥ 10 are enough to finance
the project, even under full insurance, so that condition 3.4 is satisfied. Under full
insurance, the expected pledgable income from the project equals R = 5, which is





ϑH = 5, so that assumption (3.5) is
satisfied.
3.3.1 First Best and Exclusive Competition
In order to study efficiency, I focus on the total surplus that is generated by the
project. The only variable that has an effect on total surplus, is the level up to
which liquidity shocks are financed. In this particular case one can have either
ϑ = 2, in which case the total surplus generated equals
1
2
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or ϑ = 6, in which case the total surplus equals









so that it is optimal to have ϑ = 2. This means that also means that condition (3.3)
is satisfied.
Now, I look at a “classic” exclusive competition setting, i.e. one where the
different investors offer contracts of which the borrower can accept only one. For
this, assume the following slight modification of the extensive form: after all investors
have offered their contracts, the borrower only chooses one investor (instead of a
subset of arbitrary size) with whom to do business. Under this arrangement a
classic (Bertrand, 1883) competition result holds.
Proposition 3.1. Under exclusive competition, liquidity is provided up to ϑ = 2,
repayment equals D = 4 and the borrower receives the full surplus of 3
4
.
The intuition is as follows: whenever an investor offers the borrower a contract
under which the borrower’s profits are not maximized, another investor can undercut
and offer a more favourable contract. Thus, any equilibrium must have the borrower
receiving the total surplus, and this surplus be maximized to 3
4
, with ϑ = 2. This







with J∗ = 1, L
∗
= 2 and D∗ = 4, and the borrower takes one of these contracts.
3.3.2 Market Failure
As mentioned before, in case contracting is non-exclusive, two major problems arise
that, together, make trade with bilateral contracts between investors and the bor-
rower impossible. First of all, a problem similar to that in Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and
Feriozzi (2013) arises: if the borrower can obtain a maximum liquidity provision
from any number of incumbent investors that is below the largest possible liquidity
shock, another investor can offer to extend the liquidity supply, free-riding on the
incumbents’ provision. The borrower will accept this extension as it will allow her
to continue and at least obtain a private benefit if the high shock hits. Second of all,
if multiple investors finance the borrower together, each of them has an incentive
to deviate by changing his contract in such a way that the other investors provide
more liquidity than he does. Each investor can do this by changing the marginal
price of liquidity in such a way that the borrower would rather get his liquidity first
from the other investors.
Extension of Liquidity Supply
Assume now the borrower is not restricted to deal with only one investor, but instead
can choose to deal with any number of investors, without investors able to control the
contracts the borrower trades with other investors. In case the aggregate liquidity
supply is limited to ϑ = 2, entrant investors can come in and offer to extend the
liquidity supply.
70 Essays on Competition in Banking
3.3. EXAMPLE
Assume, for example, the borrower trades the aforementioned competitive con-
tract C∗, with a single investor i. Another investor j can offer to finance the dif-
ference between the low and the high liquidity shock in exchange for a sufficiently
diluting share, but make sure that the borrower will not use this investor j’s liquidity
facility in case of the low liquidity shock. This can be implemented by a contract
Cj with Lj = 4, Dj(0) = 0, and with Dj(L) > 16 for any L > 0.
4 If the borrower
accepts contract Cj on top of C
∗, nothing changes if the low shock hits. However,
the borrower now has the possibility to continue even in case the liquidity shock is
high. She can do so by getting 2 from investor i and the promised 4 from investor j.
In these states of the world, she can continue and at least have the private benefit.




that the borrower will accept this contract offer.
For the deviating investor, the contract changes nothing if ϑ = ϑL, but if ϑ =
ϑH , he will have to provide the promised 4 units of liquidity, but will obtain a
diluting share which is the total revenue from the project diluted by his own claim





This is greater than 4 by construction, so that in the states of the world where ϑ is
high, the deviating investor receives a positive profit. This would thus constitute a
profitable deviation for investor j.
The deviation above is very similar to the type of deviation that is central in
Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi (2013). The presence of the deviation described
above entails that any allocation in which the liquidity provision is limited to ϑL
cannot be sustained in equilibrium. This result is formalized in the following lemma,
the proof of which is in the appendix.
Lemma 3.2. No allocation with ϑ = 2 can be sustained in equilibrium.
The Common Agency Problem
Lemma 3.2 gives that if competition is non-exclusive, liquidity insurance must be
provided up to ϑ = 6. In that case, since Wi = 5 for all investors i, the endowment
of any single investor is not sufficient to provide liquidity in case of the high shock,
meaning that the borrower must be financed by at least two investors at the same
time. In this case a very particular problem arises: each of the investors will want to
deviate by offering a contract that makes the other investors responsible for providing
liquidity.
In order to illustrate this problem, I will show how the deviation works for a
specific set of contracts. Note that, even though this is a specific example, this
same intuition works for any general set of contracts. Suppose there are two active
4This deviation is rather extreme. Since I am dealing with a discrete distribution, the entrant
has to finance the very large difference between ϑH and ϑL. Results still hold with smaller dilutions,
if one assumes that instead, ϑ follows a continuous distributions. The discrete distribution in this
example is chosen for expositional purposes.
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investors, i = {1, 2}, each financing exactly half the project and offering identical
contracts, i.e.
• Ji = 12 for both i,
• Li = 3 for both i, and
• Di(L) = 212 , for both i and for all L,
Then the borrower will get 3 units of money from each investor when the high
liquidity shock hits, and chooses to obtain liquidity evenly from both investors in




Note that both investors need to break even precisely, as they cannot demand
more than the investor’s pledgable income and they can only break even if they
demand the total pledgable income in all states of the world. This allocation would
thus give both investors a utility of precisely zero, would allow the borrower to
continue in all states of the world and give the borrower a utility of B = 1
2
. Now
investor 1 has an incentive to deviate by altering the contract to one with a slightly





• an unchanged initial payment J̃1 = J1 = 12
• an unchanged maximum liquidity provision L̃1 = L1 = 3,




− ε for some small enough 0 < ε < 1, and with
• the “old” repayment in case of a higher withdrawal of liquidity: D̃1(L) = 212
for L ≤ 3.
If the borrower accepts C̃1 and C2 and the high shock hits, nothing changes for the
borrower, or any of the investors: the borrower will obtain 3 units of money from
each of the investors, continue and then repay its full pledgable income, divided
evenly between the two investors.
However, if the low shock hits, the borrower can get up to 3 units of money from
investor 2, and would find it cheaper to do so, as this would cost only 5− ε instead
of 5. Ex ante, the borrower would thus be 1
2
ε better off with these two contracts.
For investor 1, the new contract means getting ε less repayment in the low state,
but also needing to provide 1 unit less liquidity. Ex ante, this improves his utility
by 1
2
(1− ε). Thus, this is a profitable deviation. Of course, investor 2 has the same
possible deviation.
Each of the two investors has an incentive to deviate, so the arrangement above
cannot be sustained in equilibrium. In any allocation with ϑ = 6, a similar deviation
is possible for at least one of the investors, giving the following lemma.
5Of course the borrower is indifferent between getting his money from one and from the other
investor, but getting money evenly would be the only subgame perfect option, as otherwise one of
the investors would make a loss.
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Lemma 3.3. No allocation with ϑ = 6 can be sustained in equilibrium.
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 together have the rather dramatic implication that if in-
vestors can only contract with the borrower directly and not among each other,
and without some sort of institution to coordinate investment, no equilibrium with
investment can be sustained, which I state here as a proposition.
Proposition 3.4. No equilibrium exists in which investors trade only directly with
borrowers and vice versa.
3.3.3 Intermediaries
Having established that no equilibrium exists with investors only trading directly
with the borrower, I now see whether there is one if I allow for the possibility of
investors contracting with one another. Without changing the information struc-
ture, an equilibrium can be established in which one investor essentially becomes an
intermediary.
Consider the following arrangement: investor 1 borrows 2 units of money from
investor 2 at date 0. He can then offer the borrower the contract with
• J1 = 1
• LL1 = 2 and LH1 = 6
• DL1 = DH1 = 5
Subsequently, at t = 2 investor 1 pays 2 units of money to investor 2, in either
state of the world. Note that, even though there is aggregate risk in the model, the
depositor’s investment is completely risk-free.
These contracts constitute a rational set of strategies for investors: as in a classic
competition set-up, the threat of free entry prevents investor 1 from making a profit,
but also, by the threat of entrants expanding the liquidity supply (as in lemma 3.2),
he is forced to, inefficiently, provide full liquidity insurance. He can finance this from
the funds obtained from investor 2. As all investors make zero profits, investor 2 is
indifferent between depositing or not. This entails that with intermediaries, trade
can still happen. Having an intermediary does not solve the exclusivity problem
and thereby cannot restore the first best, as intermediaries are also subject to po-
tential free-riding. However, the intermediary can restore trade by becoming the
sole financier of the borrower. I state this result here as a proposition.
Proposition 3.5. If M ≥ 4, and investors can become intermediaries, an equilib-
rium exists, with ϑ = 6.
3.4 Solving the General Model
In this section, I aim to analyze the general model and show that the intuition from
the example carries over to a more general setting. First I analyze the first best
and the classic cases of monopoly and exclusive competition. Then the model is
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analyzed with the restriction that borrowers only deal directly with investors, and
it is shown that the market breaks down. After that I address how trade can be
restored, first by introducing a social planner who acts as an intermediary and then
by allowing investors to become intermediaries.
3.4.1 Benchmark
In order to properly study the effects of competition, I first address, as a benchmark,










The one choice parameter in this expression is ϑ. Taking the first order condition,
one finds that a surplus-maximizing allocation should satisfy ϑ = R +B.6
In order to highlight the difference between the explicit modeling of competition
in this paper and the more classical “exclusive” competition model, I model what
happens if the borrower is restricted to deal with only one investor at the time. In
this case, any offer an investor makes that leaves him any part of the surplus, or
that doesn’t give the borrower maximum utility, will be undercut by competitors.














This break-even constraint is binding, so that the optimization problem reduces to
optimizing the total surplus as before. This means that under classic “exclusive”
competition, the first best can be attained through direct one-on-one contracting
between borrowers and investors.
3.4.2 Market Failure
As in the numerical example, two problems arise if investors contract only directly
with borrowers: again, any finite liquidity supply can be extended through offering
some additional liquidity in exchange for a diluting share. On the other hand, if
multiple investors finance a borrower together, a common agency problem arises:
each investor will want to make sure the other ones provide liquidity rather than
himself.
6This also covers the cases in which R + B is not in the support of ϑ. In those cases, setting
ϑ = R + B is equivalent to setting ϑ to the largest value in the support of ϑ that is smaller than
or equal to R + B, which would be optimal.
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Extension of the Liquidity Supply
However, as in Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi (2013), the scope for dilution cre-
ates a free-riding opportunity as long as the aggregate supply of liquidity is limited.
If a borrower only receives a limited supply of liquidity, an investor could offer to ex-
tend the liquidity provision to the borrower by a small amount. With this additional
liquidity provision on top of the one provided by the incumbents, the borrower has a
larger set of states of the world in which she can continue and obtain at least her pri-
vate benefit. The investor can offer this additional liquidity in exchange for a small,
possibly diluting, share of the project’s proceeds, only to be paid in case the addi-
tional liquidity is used. The possibility of this deviation leads to the impossibility
of limiting liquidity provision, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. In any equilibrium with non-exclusive competition, one must have
ϑ = sup Θ.
The intuition behind the proof is, as in section 3.3, that investors who don’t
have a large share in financing the borrower can always come in and offer a bit
of liquidity in exchange for a share of the project, possibly diluting the incumbent
investors, while free-riding upon their liquidity provision.
Common Agency Problem
Proposition 3.6 would imply that in equilibrium, any borrower should have any shock
financed. As investors’ endowments are limited, this means the borrower needs to
be financed by a large enough group of investors, as too small a group of investors
cannot finance any arbitrarily large shock. This financing arrangement naturally
creates a common agency situation in which each investor prefers to adjust the
pricing of their liquidity provision in such a way that the borrower prefers getting
its t = 1 funds from other investors first. This can be done in much the same way
as in the example: by giving the borrower a slight discount when he chooses to
withdraw less liquidity. As yet, there is no proof yet for a general distribution, but
the proof holds for the following special case:
Lemma 3.7. Let ϑ follow a dichotomous distribution, i.e. ϑ = ϑL with probability
pL and ϑ = ϑH with probability pH := (1− pL), then if
R− (1 + Eϑ)
pL





then there is no equilibrium with ϑ = ϑH .
The intuition behind the above statement is as follows: as the expected income
that the borrower can pledge is only limited, and the liquidity support exceeds this
limited income, the amount of expected income the borrower pays —the “price”—
of a marginal unit of liquidity support, will at some point be smaller than one.
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This means that investors receive less than their marginal cost from providing an
additional unit of liquidity. Investors will then want to give the borrower an incentive
to obtain cheap liquidity from other investors. They can do so by making their
liquidity slightly more expensive than the liquidity provided by the other investors,
so that the borrower will first obtain his liquidity from the others.
In more mathematical terms, if ϑ > R, there must be intervals where the slope
of Dj(ϑ) is smaller than 1. To see how this matters, imagine there are only two
investors, say 1 and 2, financing a borrower. As the slope of the aggregate repayment
is smaller than one, there are at least two values of ϑ, say ϑL and ϑH , with ϑL < ϑH ,
for which
D(ϑH)−D(ϑL) < ϑH − ϑL
The mathematical intuition behind the lemma is easiest if one imagines these
two values of ϑ to correspond to two positive probability states: the H(igh) and the
L(ow) state. Call the amounts of liquidity supplied by investors i in each of these
two states LLi and L
H
























This also entails that at least for one of the investors (say investor 1), it must hold
that
DH1 −DL1 < LH1 − LL1 ,
i.e. at least one of the investors (in casu, investor 1) sells the additional liquidity
between LH1 and L
L
1 at a discount. In that case, investor 2 can change the values for








2 − (DH1 −DL1 )
i.e. investor 2 asks the borrower to obtain the high liquidity from investor 1, yet
compensating the borrower for the additional cost of obtaining this higher liquidity.
In the H state nothing changes, but in the L state, the borrower will still be able
to continue by getting LH1 from investor 1 and L̃
L
2 from investor 2. As can be seen
easily, the borrower’s utility in this state is unchanged. Investor 2 will, however,
now have a utility of D̃L2 − L̃L2 in the low state, instead of DL2 − LL2 . Now














− (DH1 −DL1 )
> DL2 − LL2
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so investor 2 will be better off. This gives a mathematical idea of a profitable
deviation that exists in any allocation with ϑ
j
> R for some j. In this illustration,
investor 1 free-rides on the high potential provision of investor 2 in case the low
shock hits. When there are more than two investors, one could imagine investor 1
deviating through free-riding in the same way on the aggregate liquidity provision
of all the other active investors combined.
The reasoning above is that between two states, if one lender, or a group of
lenders, provides incremental liquidity at a discount, other lenders can save on their
liquidity by letting the borrower obtain additional liquidity from other lenders. How-
ever, in the example with a dichotomous shock, in the notation of the analysis above,
it might be so that the jump of DH1 −DL1 , and thus the discount that lender 2 needs to
give, is relatively large and exceeds the potential savings that investor 2 might make
by providing less liquidity in the L state, which is bound by LL2 . Condition (3.6)
effectively puts an upper bound onD(ϑH)−D(ϑL) and makes sure that this is not a
problem in the proof. Condition (3.7) is needed in this context to make the intuition
from the example with two lenders carry over to any case
Conditions (3.6) and (3.7) do not represent any deep economic insight: both
conditions are technical and arise as an artefact of the dichotomous distribution.
The issues in this would not be a problem if there are no “holes” in the distribution.
This reasoning gives the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3.8. If ϑ follows a continuous distribution with F (·) strictly increasing,
any allocation in which ϑ > R+B, and with more than one lender providing liquidity,
is not sustainable in equilibrium.
No Trade Result
A direct corollary of conjecture 3.8 would be that no allocation in which unlimited
liquidity is provided, can be sustained in equilibrium: any such allocation would
necessarily have more than one investor providing liquidity and would also have ϑ =
sup Θ > R+B. Together with propostion 3.6, this would entail that no equilibrium
with trade can exist if lenders deal directly with borrowers.
For the dichotomous case, this gives the following proposition
Proposition 3.9. Under the conditions of lemma 3.7, no equilibrium with trade
exists.
The way this proposition follows as a corollary from proposition 3.6 and lemma 3.7
can be stated informally as “one is not enough, two is too many:” according to
proposition 3.6, in any equilibrium, investors need to provide such a potentially
large supply of liquidity, that any borrower needs more than one investor for liquid-
ity provision. However, in case a borrower with a large potential liquidity shock is
financed by more than one investor, these investors will always have an incentive to
change the contracts they trade.
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3.5 Financial Intermediation
In this section, I aim to cover how, in the general model, trade can be restored by
an intermediary, thus bypassing the common agency problems: an intermediary, be-
ing the only one dealing with a firm, is not bothered by common agency problems.
Moreover, by pooling all the funds of different investors, she can provide full insur-
ance, and is therefore not susceptible to the problem of other investors free-riding
by extending the liquidity supply.
3.5.1 The Benevolent Bank
Having established that no trade exists under direct contracting between the bor-
rower and investors, I now see whether a social planner can restore trade in this
economy. As it turns out, a social planner can restore trade without needing any
informational advantage with respect to other participants in the economy. The
planner can do so if she can set up an institution that has a first-mover advantage
in offering contracts, both to investors and to borrowers. The planner can intervene
by pooling the funds of all the investors together and contracting investment, credit
lines, and repayments with the borrower. Effectively, she becomes an intermediary.
To see whether this institutional arrangement works, it is important to formally
define the timing of the game with the social planner intervening. At t = 0 the























Figure 3.1: Close-up of the timing for the contracting stage with the social planner.
as before and explicitly allows for investors to privately offer contracts to borrowers
after observing the planner’s offers. The elements that are added before and after
this serve to enable the planner to offer a mechanism that coordinates competition
and to make sure money is passed through the institution at the right moment.
The institution proposes a contract to the borrower providing one unit of money
up front, with unlimited liquidity support, and with a repayment that precisely
recoups the expected cost of financing and insuring the project. The borrower will
be willing to accept this contract. Waiting one round for the investors to offer
contracts will not yield a better offer for the borrower, because the investors in the
next round, if not depositing, would be competing in the exact same manner as
in the non-intermediated case analyzed above. Thus the borrower cannot expect
obtaining any better contract by waiting.
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To investors, the institution can propose very simple contracts that just offer a
unit of money at t = 2 in exchange for each unit of money invested at t = 0. This
makes investors indifferent between depositing at the social planner’s institution
on the one hand and storing or consuming on the other. For simplicity, I assume
as a tie-breaker that when indifferent, investors prefer bringing their money to the
institution.
Offering these contracts, the social planner can restore trade. I state this result
as a lemma.
Lemma 3.10. The social planner can offer a contract to the borrower and contracts
to investors that establish trade, offer investment and unlimited liquidity insurance
to the borrower and have investors break even.
Even though welfare would be higher with a limited liquidity provision, the plan-
ner cannot prevent the borrower from seeking additional liquidity from the lenders.
This makes it harder to implement an allocation with limited liquidity provision.
However, the planner could “bribe” lenders into depositing their endowment instead
of keeping it to potentially offer as an additional liquidity supply to the borrower. To
what extent this is possible is dependent upon assumptions on the extent to which
the lender can base contracts on what part of their endowments lenders actually de-
posit, instead of keep. However, whatever these assumptions, if the potential gains
by the lenders from not depositing and potentially free-riding are large enough, the
total amount that the lender needs in order to bribe all lenders into depositing is
larger than the gains from supplying less liquidity. In the dichotomous case, one
can therefore easily derive a condition under which the supply of liquidity by the
planner must always be unlimited (i.e. ϑ = ϑH):







> pLR + (1− pLϑL) (3.8)
the planner can only implement an equilibrium with ϑ = ϑH .
3.5.2 Investors as Intermediaries
Now I examine whether an equilibrium with trade can be sustained if investors can
endogenously decide to become intermediaries. For the dichotomous shock case, I
can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. An equilibrium exists in which one lender becomes an intermediary
and provides an unlimited supply of liquidity.
The proof of this lemma is entirely analogous to the proof of proposition 3.5: one
lender becomes an intermediary and collects enough money from other investors to
be able to finance up to the high shock. The investors will get their money back at
t = 2.
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3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 Bankruptcy Arrangements
In this paper, full insurance is necessary because entrants can always provide addi-
tional insurance, free-riding on the insurance provided by others. This free-riding is
made possible by dilution, which, in this paper, happens very explicitly through the
pro rata distribution upon default. However, “dilution” can happen through other
kinds of externalities between investors. Moral hazard can have a diluting effect
(Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992; Boxtel, Castiglionesi, and Feriozzi, 2013) or investors
can offer additional liquidity in exchange for increasingly speculative tranches of the
borrower’s revenue, if the revenue’s support is unbounded or very large.
3.6.2 Exclusive Competition with “Small” Investors
Alternatively, one can assume there is no exclusivity problem. In this case, the
common agency problem can still give rise to the need for financial intermediation,
as long as the optimal liquidity provision exceeds the endowment of each of the
investor. Consider again an example such as the one from section 3.3, but assume
now that B = 2 and that R = 5 + ε for some “small enough” ε.7
As before, any allocation with only one investor financing the borrower, and
with no intermediaries, can at most have ϑ = 2, as any one investor cannot finance
liquidity shocks up to ϑ = 6, due to the limited endowments. However, in any
allocation with ϑ = 2, the total surplus, which is an upper bound for the borrower’s

















Now, if trade between investors is possible, one inactive investor, say i, can offer the
following two contracts. From another inactive investor he asks 2 units of money at
t = 0, offering to return 2 + 1
3
ε at t = 2. To the borrower he offers a contract with
Ji = 1, with L
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i = 2 and L
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i = 6. As for the repayment, he can ask D
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and DHi = 5 + ε. If the borrower accepts this contract, she will reveal the liquidity














which, as ε is “small enough”, is greater than the maximum utility the borrower can
have if ϑ = 2, so that the borrower will accept this contract.
The depositing investor will then have a utility increase of 1
3
ε, meaning he will



























7As will be shown later on, this ε is just needed for certain deviations to be present. The
assumption that it is there can also be taken away by tie-breakers. As long as it is positive, ε can
be as close to zero as we want it to be, and the analysis below will still hold.
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This entails that this deviation is profitable for investor i, giving the following result
(the proof of which is exactly the above analysis).
Lemma 3.13. In case banks can trade among one another, any allocation with ϑ = 2
cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
As in section 3.3, an allocation with two investors separately financing the bor-
rower is also not possible, as the proof of lemma 3.3 carries over exactly to this
context. This entails that no equilibrium with investors independently financing the
borrower can exist. Also, no equilibrium with only one investor can exist, as this will
need to have ϑ = 2. A candidate equilibrium is suggested by the deviating investor’s
strategy in the proof of lemma 3.13: one investor can become an intermediary for
another investor. This gives us the following equilibrium.
Proposition 3.14. An equilibrium exists with one investor becoming an intermedi-
ary collecting at least 2 units of money from other investors, offering a zero interest
rate, and fully insuring the borrower’s liquidity shocks.
3.6.3 Type of Shock
The model above very much dealt with liquidity provision. The intermediate date
shock is intended to represent a more generic piece of private information that plays
a role at an intermediate stage, such as profitability of future cash flows.
3.7 Conclusion
An interesting axis for further research could be to add a trade-off between bank
financing and decentralized financing and see if there could be some further light
shed on the emergence of different types of financial systems in different times and
in different countries. Also, it would be very interesting to see whether banks in a
set-up like this one can extract rents, which would then feed back into a trade-off.
This paper does not offer so much an alternative to Diamond (1984) as a com-
plementary explanation. Indeed, in many ways the two explanations feed back into
each other. An intermediary as described in this paper would get his profits very
strongly tied to those of a firm it is financing, thus giving this intermediary a very
strong incentive to monitor. It would be very interesting to disentangle, both em-
pirically and theoretically, the “organizing” role of intermediaries described in this
paper and the delegated monitoring role in Diamond (1984).
It should be noted that in this paper, it is always one of the investors who be-
comes an intermediary. In principle, nothing stops borrowers from becoming inter-
mediaries. Whereas the former has a natural interpretation of an investor becoming
a bank, the latter can be interpreted naturally as the emergence of a trust. The-
oretically, in the model in this paper, J.P. Morgan was just as likely to emerge as
U.S. Steel.
Throughout the paper, I have followed Holmström and Tirole (1998) in assuming
the borrower cannot withdraw more investment or liquidity than needed. Of course
this assumption becomes more problematic when the liquidity provision is unlimited.
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So monitoring or relationship banking in order for investors to verify the actual use
of the liquidity provision becomes more of an issue in the non-exclusive set-up, in
which unlimited liquidity needs to be provided. This might explain why universal
banking models have been more successful in the context considered in this paper:
banks that sit on boards and hold equity stakes are more likely to know private
information and are more prone to monitor. This might merit some study of its
own.
In this paper, the intermediary can always meet its liquidity promises. An inter-
esting point for further research is to see what happens when liquidity potentially
becomes scarce. Competition, by stimulating overinsurance, could lead to new (sys-
temic) instabilities.
82 Essays on Competition in Banking
Bibliography
Acharya, V., S.A. Davydenko, and I.A. Strebulaev. 2012. “Cash holdings and credit
risk.” Review of Financial Studies :hhs106. 57
Agrawal, A. and G.N. Mandelker. 1987. “Managerial Incentives and Corporate
Investment and Financing Decisions.” The Journal of Finance 42 (4). 22
Alighieri, D. and J.D. Sinclair. 1961. The Divine Comedy: Volume 1: Inferno. A
Galaxy book ; GB65-67. Oxford University Press, USA. 41
Allen, F. and G.B. Gorton. 1993. “Churning Bubbles.” The Review of Economic
Studies 60 (4). 22, 23
Arnott, R.J. and J.E. Stiglitz. 1991. “Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets
with moral hazard.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research. 61, 62
Attar, A., C. Casamatta, A. Chassagnon, and J.P. Décamps. 2010. “Multiple
Lenders, Strategic Default and the role of Debt Covenants.” . 43, 53, 62
Attar, A. and A. Chassagnon. 2009. “On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts.”
Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (9-10):511–525. 43, 62
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Appendix A
Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The proof of the competition benchmark case proceeds in
three steps: first, we note that, because of exclusive competition, the allocation is
necessarily the one that maximizes the firm’s total surplus, subject to the lender’s
break-even constraint. The argument is a simple and classic one: in any other allo-
cation, an entrant would have the possibility to undercut the allocation and the firm
would switch to doing business with the entrant. Because of exclusive competition,
there is no way for the firm to improve on this by seeking extra financing, as it is re-
stricted to deal with only one lender at a time. Then, we find the optimal allocation(
I, ϑ,D (·)
)




. The difference to the proof in Holm-
ström and Tirole (1998) is that we allow D (·) to be any non-decreasing function.
In order to show that, as in Holmström and Tirole (1998), the solution with the





I is the optimal one, we have to make a small limiting
argument: for D (·) we take a class of piecewise constant functions on equidistant
intervals, then arguing that, for arbitrarily small intervals, the solution remains the





I for all ϑ, and with
I =
A
F (ϑ∗) (ϑ∗ − ρ0)
.
The type of function we choose for D (·) is, for an arbitrary integer N , charac-
terized by the parameters ϑ, the liquidity level up to which the total repayment is
incentive compatible, and ϑ, the maximum liquidity level. It is further characterized
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where 1 is an indicator, equal to one if its argument is true and zero if it is not. The













































Before we address the maximization problem, we note that ϑ > 0 and that F (ϑ) > 0,
as otherwise the NPV of the project is negative, and no surplus is divided at all.
Also note that the proposed solution generates a positive surplus, so the optimal


































































































































































I, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N,
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with the associated Lagrange multipliers (µn)
N




n ≤ pLRI, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N,
with the associated Lagrange multipliers (νn)
N
n=1, and finally the constraint that
ϑ ≤ ϑ





















































which, by condensing the telescoping sum1, can be rewritten as




























With respect to ϑ, the first order condition is




















































n=1 (an − an−1) = aN −a0. Henceforth, in this proof, we will use this identity a number
of times without explicitly mentioning it.
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Getting the expressions for µn and νn from equations (A.4) and (A.5), and substi-
tuting these into (A.1), we obtain (recalling the notation ρ1 := pHR for total income






























which can be rewritten as











































As stated before, the total surplus must be positive under the optimal solution, so
that
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so that necessarily λ > 1 (i.e., the break-even constraint for the firm must bind) and
thus µn > 0 for all n. Note that we cannot draw the same conclusion about νn, as







I. This means that
condition (A.2) can be rewritten as:
((ρ1 − ρ0)− (pLR +B)) f (ϑ) I
= ξ − λρ0f (ϑ) I +
N∑
n=1



























Now we need to show that ϑ = ϑ. In order to do so, assume by contradiction that
ϑ < ϑ. In that case, all the νn’s must be greater than zero, so that by equations
(A.5) and DHn = RI for all n, and also ξ must be zero, so that the above equation
becomes
((ρ1 − ρ0) I − (pLR +B) I) f (ϑ) = −λρ0f (ϑ) I + (λ− 1) pLRf (ϑ) I.
Dividing out f (ϑ) I, we get
(ρ1 − ρ0)−B = −λ (ρ0 − pLR)
Furthermore, because λ > 0, the break-even constraint binds and we get that
λ = −(ρ1 − ρ0)−B
ρ0 − pLR
. (A.8)



























) = − pL∆pB
ρ0 − pLR
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and ϑ = ϑ∗, which would also mean that ϑ∗ = pHR− ∆ppL ρ0, which
already leads to a contradiction for all sets of primitives for which ϑ∗ 6= pHR− ∆ppL ρ0,
so that when ϑ∗ 6= pHR − ∆ppL ρ0, the solution must satisfy ϑ = ϑ. This gives that,
adding equation (A.3) to (A.7) and dividing by I, we obtain



































and ϑ = ϑ∗. This, together with the break-even constraint, gives
that the optimal allocation is the one with
I =
A
F (ϑ∗) (ϑ∗ − ρ0)
,








Having established the results for all sets of primitives with ϑ∗ 6= pHR − ∆ppL ρ0,
we now turn our attention to the special case with ϑ∗ = pHR− ∆ppL ρ0. QED





that maximizes his profits under the firm’s participation constraint.
This gives rise to an optimization problem that can be solved in a manner entirely
analogous to the one used in the proof of Proposition 2.2 and will thus also give
a constant, a repayment that is always incentive compatible, and a liquidity level
that minimizes the effective cost of investment. However, in this case, it is not the
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for all ϑ. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.4. . For this proposition, we assume an equilibrium concept
akin to trembling-hand perfection. We assume that, for any offered contract other
than the subgame perfect one, there is a small chance ε that the firm accepts this
contract, where we let ε tend to zero. This precludes loss-giving contracts from
being offered, even if they would not be accepted on the equilibrium path.
The proof proceeds by contradiction: assume that the equilibrium is character-




IC . An inactive lender, say i, can offer the contract (Ji, Li (·) , Di(·)) with
Ji = 0, with
Li(m) =
{





∆D := RI −DC if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
0 otherwise
for some ∆ϑ small enough in the sense that
E(ϑ− ϑ | ϑ < ϑ < ϑ+ ∆ϑ) < pL(RI −D).
Note that such ∆ϑ exists since the distribution of ϑ is continuous and increasing.
Accepting this offer on top of the set of contracts giving (IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)), the firm will
be able to attract liquidity in case ϑ < ϑ < ϑ+∆ϑ, and then reap at least the private
benefits. This raises the firm’s ex ante expected utility by
(
F (ϑ+ ∆ϑ)− F (ϑ)
)
BI,
and giving the entrant an expected profit equal to(
F (ϑ+ ∆ϑ)− F (ϑ)
) (
pL(RI
C −DC)− E(ϑ | ϑ < ϑ < ϑ+ ϑÑ+1)
)
This constitutes a profitable deviation for the entrant. This gives that the allocation
(IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)) cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Now it remains to be proven that this type of deviation cannot be prevented by
the existence of so-called latent contracts that are not traded, but are offered. As-
sume by contradiction that there is a set of contracts that together would constitute
an allocation (I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)). For any allocation (I, ϑ̄, D (·)), denote the firm’s utility
by U(I, ϑ̄, D (·)) and the lenders’ aggregate profits by Π(I, ϑ̄, D (·)). Note that if
D′ (ϑ′) + ∆D < RI ′, deviations such as the above would not be a problem, so we
can assume that D′ (ϑ′) + ∆D~≥RI ′. The type of deviation above is not a profitable
strategy only if this set of contracts is chosen after the above deviation for any ∆ϑ,
but not before the deviation. For this to be the case one must have on the one hand
that
U(I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) ≤ U(IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)),
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but on the other hand that for all ∆ϑ
U(I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) + (F (ϑ′ + ∆ϑ)− F (ϑ′))BI ′
> U(IC , ϑ∗, DC (·))U(I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) + (F (ϑ∗ + ∆ϑ)− F (ϑ∗))BIC .
This means that
U(I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) = U(IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)),
but (I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) is different from (IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)). However,
(
IC , ϑ∗, DC (·)
)
is
the allocation that maximizes U(I, ϑ̄, D (·)) subject to Π(I, ϑ̄, D (·)) ≥ 0. This
entails that Π(I ′, ϑ̄′, D′ (·)) < 0, meaning that at least one lender offers a contract
that would give him a loss if accepted. If there is any positive probability that the
firm mistakenly accepts this contract, this lender would suffer a loss. Therefore,
this lender would be better off not offering any contract. Thus, this cannot be the
case in any equilibrium satisfying our notion of trembling hand perfection and the
deviation mentioned above remains a profitable strategy. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.5. . Assume by contradiction that the equilibrium is charac-
terized by the allocation (I, ϑ, D (·)), with ϑ < ∞. An entrant lender, say i, can
offer the contract (Ji, Li (·) , Di(·)) with Ji = 0, with
Li(m) =
{





D if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
0 otherwise
for some ∆ϑ small enough and D large enough in the sense that








Note that such ∆ϑ exists since the distribution of ϑ is continuous and increasing.
Accepting this offer on top of the offers by incumbent lenders, the firm will be able
to attract liquidity in case ϑ < ϑ < ϑ + ∆ϑ, and then reap at least the private
benefits. This raises the firm’s ex ante expected utility by
(
F (ϑ+ ∆ϑ)− F (ϑ)
)
BI,
and gives the entrant an expected profit equal to
(











ϑ | ϑ < ϑ < ϑ+ ϑÑ+1
))
.
This constitutes a profitable deviation for the entrant. Thus, (I, ϑ,D (·)) cannot be
sustained in equilibrium.
A simple argument shows that any contracts that are offered, but not traded,
would not change this result: if the deviation mentioned above would trigger any
combination of these “latent” contracts to be traded, the aggregate of these contracts
would still be susceptible to the same kind of deviation. QED
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Proof of Proposition 2.6. . To see that no entrant has an incentive to offer a contract
that the firm would accept on top of C0, we first note that no entrant has an incentive
to only increase the liquidity supply to the firm, as this supply is already unlimited.
Because of the clause withholding liquidity insurance, the entrant, say i, needs to
supply liquidity.
Denote by Ci =
(
J̃i, L̃i (·) , D̃i (·)
)
the contract that the entrant offers, by Ĩ :=




liquidity shock that can be financed when the firm accepts C0 and C̃i. Because
the entrant causes the repayment to be the full value of the potential revenue upon
increasing the project size, low effort will always be induced. For any repayment Di
that the entrant wants, he can thus get at most pLRĨ
Di
Di+RI
< pLRĨ and the firm





BĨ. Now this should be greater than the utility from acccepting only





BĨ ≥ (ρ1 − ρ0) (A+ J0) .







(A+ J0) . (A.9)
As said, for all ϑ, the entrant’s revenue is smaller than pLRĨ. This means that the


































Combining this with condition (A.9), we find that the profits of the entrant are
negative for any acceptable contract. Without unlimited liquidity supply entrants
would have an incentive to deviate. Also, given the unlimited liquidity supply, this
contract optimizes the firm’s utility subject to the lender’s break-even constraint (as
can be shown by methods analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 2.2), so
that no entrant has an incentive to deviate by undercutting Lender 0’s offer. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.7. . Let lender 0 offer the contract from Proposition 2.6.
Then no lender other than lender 0. has an incentive to deviate, as noted in Propo-
sition 2.6. Lowering the liquidity supply leaves an incentive to deviate for the en-
trants, who can then extend the liquidity supply. Any contract that gives Lender
0 a higher profit while keeping the liquidity supply unlimited will give entrants an
incentive to undercut. Thus Lender 0 also has no incentive to deviate. QED
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Proof of Proposition 2.8. . This is a direct consequence of Propositions 2.5 and 2.7.
First of all, by Proposition 2.7 an equilibrium exists characterized by the mentioned
allocation. Then, by Proposition 2.5, any equilibrium must satisfy ϑ = ∞. Fur-
thermore, the allocation must optimize the firm’s utility given the restriction of
unlimited liquidity support and given the lenders’ break-even constraint. Again,
it can be proven, analogously to the proof of Proposition 2.2, that this optimal










1 + Eϑ− ρ0
.
QED
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 with a Finite Number
of Principals
In this section, we assume that there are N < ∞ lenders, indexed i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
simultaneously offering contracts. We derive results for a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. First, we establish the equivalent to Proposition 2.4.






IC cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Proof. For this proposition, we assume the same equilibrium concept as in Proposi-
tion 2.4. The proof proceeds by contradiction: assume that the equilibrium is char-







First, if there is an inactive lender, then this lender has an incentive to deviate
by offering the type of contract mentioned in the proof of Lemma 2.4. If there is no
inactive lender, consider a lender i with








i.e., the lender who provides the smallest amount of liquidity to the firm at the firm’s














Now lender i can change the contract to
(
J̃i, L̃i (·) , D̃i (·)
)
with J̃i = Ji, with
L̃i(m) =
{
Li (m) if 0 ≤ m ≤ ϑ
m− ϑ if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
for some small enough ∆ϑ, and with
D̃i(m) =
{







+RI −DC if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
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ϑ− ϑ|ϑ < ϑ ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
))
,
which is positive for ∆ϑ small enough. This means that lender i has an incentive to
deviate. QED
The intuition behind the proof is simple. If there is an inactive lender in equilib-
rium, he will want to behave just like the entrant in Proposition 2.4. If all lenders
are active, and if the number of lenders is large enough, at least one lender will have
such a small stake in the firm that he will effectively want to act as an entrant. A
direct corollary is the following:
Corollary B.2. If N > ϑ∗ ∆p
pLB
, none of the benchmark allocations can be sustained
in equilibrium.
Proof. If N > ϑ∗ ∆p
pLB







so that they cannot be sustained in equilibrium. QED
Now we will establish the equivalents to the results in Section 2.5.2. We also
assume that the investment size I is observable at both t = 1 and t = 2, so that
the lender can penalize the firm for seeking additional up-front investment. The
size is used in the contract in the exact same way as it is in the free-entry model.
However, throughout the proofs, we suppress the explicit size clauses in the contract
for expositional purposes. Again we assume that strategic default is possible and
division is pro rata. This gives us the following result, equivalent to Proposition 2.5:
Proposition B.3. No equilibrium with ϑ
N
< pLR can exist.
Proof. Assume there is an equilibrium with ϑI
N
< pLRI. First, if there is an inactive
lender, then this lender has an incentive to deviate by offering the type of contract
mentioned in the proof of Lemma 2.4. If there is no inactive lender, consider a lender
i with



















Now lender i can change its contract to
(
J̃i, L̃i (·) , D̃i (·)
)
with J̃i = Ji, with
L̃i(m) =
{
Li (m) if 0 ≤ m ≤ ϑ
m− ϑ if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
for some small enough ∆ϑ, and with
D̃i(m) =
{
Di (m) if 0 ≤ m ≤ ϑ
D̃ if ϑ < m ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ.
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ϑ− ϑ|ϑ < ϑ ≤ ϑ+ ∆ϑ
))
,
which is positive for ∆ϑ small enough and D̃ large enough. This means that lender
i has an incentive to deviate. QED
Again, the intuition is that, if at least one lender is inactive, he will behave like an
entrant. If all lenders are active, one of them is small enough to want to behave like
an entrant. This proposition gives a necessary condition for the maximum liquidity
shock that has to be insured in equilibrium, namely that
ϑ ≥ NpLR.
Assuming that the set of possible levels of the liquidity shock Θ is bounded, one has
the following corollary:
Corollary B.4. If N > sup Θ
pLR
, then no allocation with ϑ < sup Θ can be sustained
in equilibrium.
Proof. If N > sup Θ
pLR
and ϑ < sup Θ, then ϑ
N
< pLR, so that an allocation with
ϑ < sup Θ cannot be sustained. QED
This corollary says that, when N is large enough with respect to the potential
liquidity shock, then liquidity support in equilibrium is essentially unbounded. The
intuition is that, if the largest potential liquidity shock is not too large, and the
number of investors is large enough, then even at the largest liquidity shock, one
investor will be contributing so little to the firm’s liquidity insurance that he will
want to behave as an entrant.
Establishing the existence of an equilibrium is technically more involved in the
simultaneous-move game than it is under free entry, but the intuitions remain the
same. In any equilibrium, the threat of entry must now be explicitly modeled by
latent contracts offered by inactive lenders. We can state the following existence
result.
Proposition B.5. Assume that N ≥ 4, that
(ρ1 − ρ0)A
1 + Eϑ− ρ0
≥ UA,
and that for all ϑ̃ < sup Θ, one has
ρ0 > E
(
ϑ− ϑ̃|ϑ ≥ ϑ̃
)
;
then, there exists an equilibrium with the lenders breaking even, with ϑ = sup Θ, and
with a flat, incentive-compatible repayment.
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Proof. First of all, two lenders, say lenders 3 and 4, offer a contract that serves
the same function as the “threat”of the entrant expanding the liquidity supply: for
i ∈ {3, 4} : (Ji, Li (·) , Di (·)) , with Ji = 0, with Li (m) = m and with
Di(m) =
{
0 if m = 0
D if m > 0
for some large enough D.
With this contract on offer, whenever all lenders, except for 3 and 4, together offer
an acceptable allocation with ϑ < sup Θ, the firm accepts contract 3 on top of what







Two other lenders, say lenders 1 and 2, both offer the contract (Ji, Li (·) , Di (·)) ,














(A+ Ji), i.e., with a precisely incentive-compatible repayment.
All other lenders just offer the null contract. With these three contracts on offer,
the firm chooses either C1 or C2, upon which no lender makes a profit, and the firm
earns a total consumption utility of
(ρ1 − ρ0)A
1 + Eϑ− ρ0
,
which, by assumption, is larger than the firm’s reservation utility. To see that no
lender has an incentive to deviate, first think of a deviation in which a lender, say
i, offers a contract with a finite maximum supply of liquidity. Proving that the best
contract of this type asks for a flat, incentive-compatible repayment is done in a
manner entirely analogous to the proofs of the same result from the section with
the benchmark cases, so we restrict our attention to deviating contracts of the form
C̃i =
(





m if 0 ≤ m ≤ Li
0 if m > Li











if the firm accepts the contract C̃i, it will also accept contract 3 or 4. Upon this,

























(ρ1 − ρ0) Ĩi
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Combining, we find the following expression for the lender’s net profit:
A+
(





























(ρ1 − ρ0) Ĩi ≥
(ρ1 − ρ0)A

















(1 + Eϑ− ρ0)
,
and lender i’s profits are
A+
(


























ϑ− ϑ̃|ϑ ≥ ϑ̃
)
− ρ0 − pL D̃D̃+DRĨi
))














Because D was assumed to be large enough, the right hand side of this equality is
negative, as ρ0 > E
(






< 1, meaning that a deviating lender
would always make a loss with a deviation that is acceptable for the firm. This means
that there is no possible deviation involving a lender offering a contract with only
a limited supply of liquidity. To see that no lender would deviate with a contract
with an unlimited supply of liquidity, one needs to observe that the contracts offered
by lenders 1 and 2 are the ones offering the highest utility to the firm, given the
restrictions that lenders must break even and that the liquidity supply must be
unlimited. This means that there are no profitable deviations for any of the lenders
other than 1 and 2. Also, any deviation by lender 1 would make the firm accept the
contract by lender 2 and vice versa. The proof that these contracts are indeed the
optimal ones is exactly analogous to the proofs in the benchmark cases. QED
To get an idea of when the technical prerequisites of the above proposition are
satisfied, we state the following corollary:
Corollary B.6. Let ϑ follow an exponential distribution with parameter λ; then, if







, there exists an equilibrium with trade and an
unlimited supply of liquidity.
Proof. For the exponential distribution, we have E
(
ϑ− ϑ̃|ϑ ≥ ϑ̃
)
= Eϑ = 1
λ
. Fill-
ing this in gives the conditions for Proposition B.5. QED
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Now we see that the results from the free-entry analysis in the main paper carry
over to a more formal game with simultaneous moves and a finite number of players.
By proposition B.3, we have found a lower bound on the total supply of liquidity in
any equilibrium. If the support of the liquidity shock is bounded, this translates into
a basically unlimited supply of liquidity by Corollary B.4. Furthermore, with propo-
sition B.5, we have found sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
with unlimited liquidity provision.
104 Essays on Competition in Banking
Appendix C
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Assume that any allocation leaves the borrower with a
surplus U < 3
4
. In that case, an inactive investor i can offer the contract with
Ji = 1, with Li = 2 and with Di(2) = 4 + ε, where 0 < ε < 1 +B− 2U. In that case,
when accepting the contract, the borrower will have a utility of
1
2
(R +B −Di(2)) =
1
2
(1 +B − ε) > U,








so this is a profitable deviation for the investor. Thus any equilibrium must provide
the maximum surplus of 3
4
to the borrower. This also entails that ϑ = 2 and lenders
must break even. An example equilibrium is one in which at least two investors offer






, with J∗ = 1, L
∗
= 2, and D∗ ≡ 4. The borrower
then takes one of these contracts. QED
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Assume an equilibrium with ϑ = 2. Now, there is at least one
investor who supplies less than 2
M
when the low liquidity shock realizes. Assume this
investor is active. Call this investor i, and the amount this investor supplies when
the low liquidity shock hits LLi . This investor can now modify his contract to one(
J̃ , L̃, D̃(·)
)
, with J̃i = Ji, with Li = 4 +L
L
i , with D̃i(L) = Di(L
L
i ) for L ≤ LLi , and
with D̃i(L) = D for L ≤ LLi , with D large enough. In case this investor is inactive,
the same works with J̃i = 0, Li = 4 and D̃i(L) = D1{L>0}.
If the borrower accepts this contract, on top of all the other ones that were
traded in our conjectured equilibrium, nothing changes in case the low liquidity
shock realizes. However, if the high liquidity shock realizes, it can still withdraw
a total of 2 − LLi from all active investors except for i, and 4 + L
L
i from investor
i. This will give the borrower at least the private benefit in case the high shock
realizes, so that the borrower is better off ex ante accepting this contract. For
investor i, nothing changes in case the low shock hits, but if the high shock hits,
he will receive 5 D
D+D(2)
− (4 + LLi ), which is greater than zero, because D is large
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and N was assumed to be large enough. This means that there
is a profitable deviation and the assumed equilibrium can not be sustained. QED
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Denote by I the set of investors with which the borrower
trades.
Assume ϑ = 6. In that case, at least two investors must be active in equilibrium.
If in any state of the world, the total due repayment to investors were to be greater
than 5, each active investor would have an incentive to increase his share of the
revenue by further diluting the other investors. Therefore, this proof focuses on
























This means that for both states of the world, the total repayment has to be∑
i∈I
Di (Li(ϑ)) = 5.
Now first of all, the repayments to each of the investors must be constant over the
two different states. Otherwise, there must be one investor i such that Di(Li(2)) <
Di(Li(6)), giving also that D−i(L−i(2)) > D−i(L−i(6)), giving that L−i(2) > L−i(6).
This means that L−i(6) < 2, so that Li(6) > 4. Also, Li(6) ≤ 5, so L−i(6) ≥ 1.
Assume that D−i (L−i(2)) − D−i (L−i(6)) < L−i(2) − L−i(6), i.e. the combined
provision of lenders other than i sells the incremental units of liquidity between
L−i(6) and L−i(2) at a discount. Lender i, could take advantage of this by offering
a contract with C ′i with J
′
i = Ji L
′
i = 6− L−i(2) and
D′i(L) =
{
Di (Li(2)) if L ≤ Li(2)
Di (Li(6))− (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6))) if L > Li(2)
In that case, the borrower would be better off choosing the contracts C ′i and all the
contracts in I \ {i}. In case ϑ = 2, this would not change anything, and in case
ϑ = 6, the firm can get L
′
i from lender i and L−i(2) from the others at a total price
of
Di (Li(6))− (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6))) +D−i (L−i(2)) = D(6)
so that she has the same repayment in case the high shock hits. For lender i this
will raise his utility in case the high shock hits by
L−i(2)− L−i(6)− (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6))) > 0,
so this constitutes a profitable deviation.
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Assume that D−i (L−i(2)) − D−i (L−i(6)) > L−i(2) − L−i(6), then all lenders
except for i sell the incremental liquidity from L−i(6) and L−i(2) at a mark-up.
This means lender i can “undercut” them for this incremental provision. He could
do so by lowering his price for obtaining 2− L−i(6) to
D′i := Di (Li(2)) + (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)))− ε.
In this case, when ϑ = 2 the borrower is better off getting L−i(6) from the lenders
other than i, and 2−L−i(6) from lender i. This would mean an improvement for the
borrower, and lender i will now, in case ϑ = 2, instead of Di (Li(2))− Li(2), obtain
D′i (2− L−i(6))
= Di (Li(2)) + (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)))− ε− (2− L−i(6))
= Di (Li(2)) + (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)))− ε− (Li(2) + L−i(2)− L−i(6))
= Di (Li(2))− Li(2)− ε+ ((D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)))− (L−i(2)− L−i(6))) ,
which, as long as ε is small enough, is greater than Di (Li(2))−Li(2). This constitutes
a profitable deviation for lender i.
Now the case is left with D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)) = L−i(2)−L−i(6). In that
case also Di (Li(6))−Di (Li(2)) = L−i(2)−L−i(6). In that case, a lender j 6= i could
offer the contract C ′j with J
′
j = J−i, with L
′
j = L−i(6) and with
D′i(L) =
{
D−i (L−i(6))− ε if L = 0
D−i (L−i(6)) if L > 0
If the borrower chooses contracts j and i, she will choose to obtain all liquidity from
lender i in case the low shock hits, paying
D−i (L−i(6))− ε+Di(2) ≤ D−i (L−i(6)) +Di (Li(6))− ε
= D(6)− ε
< D(2).
The borrower will make the same aggregate profit as all lenders in I \ {i} in case
the high shock hits, but in case the low shock hits, he will obtain
D−i (L−i(6))− ε = D−i (L−i(2))− (D−i (L−i(2))−D−i (L−i(6)))− ε
= D−i (L−i(2))− (L−i(2)− L−i(6))− ε,
which, for ε small enough, is greater than D−i (L−i(2)) − L−i(2), so that lender j
makes a profit which is strictly greater than the aggregate profit made by all active
lenders except i. Now, this is profitable for lender j, as if j ∈ I, then j’s profit can
not be higher than that of all the lenders in I \ {i} combined, and if j /∈ I, he will
go from zero profits to a nonzero profit.
Having established that the repayments are constant over states of the world,
meaning that each lender provides liquidity at a marginal price of zero, it is possible
to show that there always exists a profitable deviation for at least one of the lenders.
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This means that there exists an investor i that supplies a positive amount LLi in






and D̃Li = D
L
i − ε, and with L̃Hi = LHi and D̃Hi = DHi . The borrower would then
prefer getting as much of its liquidity as possible from the other investors in the low
state. This will save the borrower 1
2








ex ante. Thus, there exists an incentive to deviate for investor i. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4. This is a direct consequence of lemmas 3.2 and 3.3: in any
allocation with ϑ = 2, there are incentives to deviate, as there are in any allocation
with ϑ = 6. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Consider the following set of strategies: at least two can-
didate intermediaries (call the set of these intermediaries B), offer a contract to two
of the other investors (call the set of these investors D), asking for one unit of money
from each of them, for which he will return precisely one unit of money at t = 2.
The intermediaries offer the borrower the contract with J1 = 1, with L1 = 6 and
with D(L) = 5 for all L. At least two other investors than the intermediary (call the
set of these investors L) offer the contract which offers no initial investment, offers
Li = 4 and with
Di(L) =
{
0 if L = 0
D if L > 0
for some very large D. Note that the sets D and L are not necessarily disjoint, one
could even have them be exactly the same. I only assume B∩D and B∩L are empty.
With these contracts on offer, the borrower chooses to do business with investor 1
and both investors in D deposit their money.
Any more attractive contract for the borrower should have L = 2, but if any
one of the investors deviates by offering such a contract, the borrower would always
take one of the contracts from L as well. Assume a borrower i deviates by offering

















In order to have the borrower prefer this contract, it must have Di(2) < R, so that
if D is large enough, the deviating investor’s utility is negative. QED
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Proof of Proposition 3.6. This proof is largely analogous to the one of lemma 3.2
and proceeds by contradiction. Assume ϑ < sup Θ. This means that there is a value








> 0 and 0 < ∆ϑ < R.




with Ji = 0, with Li = ∆Θ and with
Di(L) =
{
0 if L = 0
D if L > 0
for some large enough D. QED
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Assume that ϑ = ϑH . Now, first of all note that since W ≥
2
3
ϑH , it is always possible to divide the active lenders into two disjoint subsets I1







This justifies considering the problem as if it were one with only two lenders. Below,
I will consider equilibria with only two lenders, but every time I mention a deviating
strategy by lender k ∈ {1, 2}, one can read that “a lender in Ik” executes this
deviating strategy. If I say that an inactive lender can play a strategy to undercut
lender k, one can also read that, if there are no inactive lenders, a lender in Ik can
execute this strategy. Thus, I will focus on the case I = {1, 2} and use the index
−i to indicate the quantities and contracts for the lender other than i.1
Note that in the case of a dichotomous ϑ, the assumptions of the model give that
I + ϑL < I + pLϑ
L + pHϑ
H ≤ R < R +B < ϑH .
Furthermore, R > ϑH , and ϑH > WϑH − ϑL. The proof is largely analogous to the
one of lemma 3.3.















≥ 1 + Eϑ,













≥ R− (1 + Eϑ)
pL
,


















. In order to









the cases in which
1i.e. quite pedantically, lender 3− i.
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, which also includes





























, the lender other









This means that lender i can undercut this lender for this part of the liquidity





























for some small enough ε. This makes that, in case the low shock hits, the borrower








from the other lenders.
This raises the borrower’s utility by ε. Lender i will now have the same utility if the










































































































, so this constitutes





















, the lender other than









This means that lender i can profit from this cheap liquidity. He can do so by
offering the contract C ′i with a maximum liquidity provision of L
′
i := ϑ

























This would make the borrower, in the high state, opt to obtain L−i (ϑL) from lender
−i, and ϑH −L−i (ϑL) from lender i, not changing her utility in the high state. For
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. This constitutes a profitable deviation.
If, however, lender −i sells the additional liquidity between L−i(ϑH) and L−i(ϑL)
at a fair price, lender i necessarily sells his incremental liquidity between Li(ϑ
L) and
Li(ϑ

























D(ϑH)−D(ϑL)− (ϑH − ϑL)
)
.
In that case, it is lender −i who can free-ride on the incremental provision of lender

































H)− Li(ϑL), lender −i saves L−i(ϑL) in the L-state by providing





























































This gives a profitable deviation.
This gives that both lenders must provide more money in the high state than









proceed in much the same way as before. First, I look at the case in which one
lender overcharges for incremental liquidity, and then at the case when both sell
incremental liquidity at least at a fair price, with at least one of them selling at a
discount.






























, this gives that an inactive lender j can undercut this lender2
for this part of the liquidity provision. To do so, he gives a contract with Jj = 0,
























− ε if L > 0,
for some small enough ε. In case the low shock hits, nothing changes, but when the

















from lender −i. This raises the borrower’s
utility by pHε. Lender j will now have a profit of zero, as he did before, in case the














































2If all lenders are active, this condition can be replaced by one of the active lenders adding this
provision to the contract he is already trading, thereby increasing his profit.
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which, for ε small enough, is greater than zero, so this constitutes a profitable
deviation for lender j.
If for both lenders the incremental liquidity is sold at at least a fair price, then









































. This means that lender i
can profit from the cheap liquidity offered by lender −i.
He can do so by offering the contract C ′i with a maximum liquidity provision of
L
′









































from lender i, not changing her utility in the high













































































































. This constitutes a profitable deviation.
































































ϑH − W. This means that for lender i the amount he can save by this deviation,






must be greater than Li(ϑ








Proof of Lemma 3.12. Consider the following set of strategies: at least two candi-
date intermediaries (call the set of these intermediaries B), offer a contract to two of
the other investors (call the set of these investors D), asking for at least 1 +ϑH −W
units of money from both of them together, for which he will return precisely one
unit of money at t = 2.
The intermediaries offer the borrower the contract with Ji = 1, with Li = ϑ
H and
with D(L) such that 1 +ϑH −W ≤ D(ϑH) ≤ R and pLD(ϑL) + pHD(ϑH) = 1 +Eϑ.
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At least two investors other than the intermediary (call the set of these investors
L) offer the contract which offers no initial investment, offers Li = ϑH−ϑL and with
Di(L) =
{
0 if L = 0
D if L > 0
for some very large D. Note that the sets D and L are not necessarily disjoint, one
could even have them be exactly the same. I only assume B ∩ D and B ∩ L are
empty. With these contracts on offer, the borrower chooses to do business with one
of the investors in B and both investors in D deposit their money.
Any more attractive contract for the borrower should have L = ϑL, but if any
one of the investors deviates by offering such a contract, the borrower would always
take one of the contracts from L as well. Assume a borrower i deviates by offering
a contract with Ji = 1 and Li = ϑ

















In order to have the borrower prefer this contract, it must have Di(2) < R, so that
if D is large enough, the deviating investor’s utility is negative. QED
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